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IN JUNE

1980, Supreme Court held in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, by a
five to four majority, that living organisms can be patented. 2 Although
the Court suggested that the holding was required by the text of the
federal patent subject matter statute, in reality neither statutory text
nor legal precedent directly addressed this issue. In fact, given the
pioneering nature of the patent application at issue, a holding against
patentability in the case would have been both easier to justify and
significantly less controversial than the Court's actual holding. Far
from simply applying clear law to facts, the Court in Chakrabarty
adopted an aggressive method of interpretation in order to bring a
statute into conformity with changing technology. Although numerous congressional debates about Chakrabarty have occurred in the
nearly quarter-century since the decision, Chakrabarty was never overridden by Congress.
This Article considers the Chakrabartydecision and Congress's response to it in light of several contemporary views on statutory interpretation. It concludes that in science- and technology-related cases in
which outdated legal rules could significantly hamper the advancement of the field, the Supreme Court should interpret federal statutes
dynamically in response to a changing social context, but should also
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attempt to conform its interpretations to legislative preferences in order to avoid a legislative override.
This approach has been proposed and discussed in several articles by Professor William Eskridge. Eskridge has endorsed a theory of
"dynamic statutory interpretation" under which courts, in certain limited circumstances, may modify the interpretation of a statute in light
of external social changes. He has also posited, however, that the Supreme Court often tries to avoid legislative override by attempting to
mirror legislative preferences3 and suggests that such behavior by the
Court is in many cases normatively desirable. 4 Several writers have
produced important alternatives to Eskridge's model. Professor John
Manning, an adherent of the textualist approach, argues that judges
should focus only on the plain text of a statute, ignoring contemporary social context and legislative preferences as well as any information about the enacting legislature's intent that might be gleaned
from legislative history. 5 Professor Einer Elhauge, by contrast, endorses dynamic statutory interpretation, but in a more limited form
than Eskridge. Elhauge would permit such interpretation only when
the Court is confident that an interpretive preference could be enacted
by the current legislature, not simply when the legislature would not
override the interpretation, as Eskridge suggests. 6
Putting aside the question of how the Court actually behaves, this
Article argues that normatively, at least in the narrow realm of technological development, Eskridge's approach is the superior one. In cases
such as Chakrabarty, in which the statutory text is itself ambiguous and
the enacting legislature could not have conceived of the contemporary context of a particular statute, Manning's theory provides insufficient guidance. For the same class of cases, Elhauge's approach
excessively restricts the Court's ability to advance the law through
quick action where Congress might otherwise take years to address an
issue due to political wrangling or procedural roadblocks. This point
is particularly significant in the patent field, where the rapid pace of
technological and scientific change requires frequent statutory
changes.
3. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv.
1479, 1481 (1987) [hereinafter Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation].
4. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE LJ. 331, 378-79, 404-05 (1991) [hereinafter Eskridge, Overriding].
5. See generally John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L.
REv. 673 (1997).
6. See generally Einer Elhauge, Preference-EstimatingStatutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM.
L. REv. 2027 (2002).
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The strength of the proposed approach depends on the responsiveness of Congress-if Congress is unable to override Supreme
Court statutory interpretations of which it disapproves, then this approach would permit an unelected Court to enact its personal policy
preferences into law. Analysis of this issue is problematic due to the
complexity of the legislative process, which makes it difficult to interpret both legislative action, such as the initiation of hearings or a floor
discussion, and legislative inaction, which may stem from lack of interest in an issue, interest group pressure, or even simple inertia. Based
on an analysis of the congressional response to Chakrabartyand on the
research of Professor Eskridge, this Article concludes, however, that in
the patent law context the approach described above is feasible and
appropriate, providing the proper balance between significant interests in technological progress and important concerns about
countermajoritarianism.
In light of these conclusions, the Supreme Court's holding in
Chakrabartywas correct. Part I of this Article describes the Chakrabarty
decision and the relevant legal precedent, demonstrating that despite
the conservative tone of the opinion, the Court's holding was a clear
assertion of authority to use expansive statutory interpretation in order to update statutes in light of changing social circumstances. Part II
details the minimal congressional response immediately following the
decision and the more significant response following the Board of Patent Appeals's broad interpretation of the decision in 1987. Part III
explains Professor Eskridge's theories of statutory interpretation and
considers two important alternatives to his approach. It also describes
his findings, in light of questions posed in this Article, as to Congress's
ability to respond to Supreme Court holdings. The Article concludes
that due to the importance of preventing delay in many cases related
to scientific advancement, the Supreme Court should be free to interpret statutes dynamically in such cases, while consciously attempting
to avoid legislative override.
I.

Chakrabarty and Its Aftermath

A.

The Supreme Court Decision

In 1972, Ananda Chakrabarty, a microbiologist working at General Electric ("GE"), filed a patent application for a bacterium that
was capable of breaking down certain components of crude oil, an
7
innovation that he suggested could be useful in cleaning up oil spills.
7.

Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 305.
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Chakrabarty developed the bacterium by transferring four plasmids
(small circular DNA molecules), each with the ability to break down
particular components of oil, into a Pseudomonas bacterium, which
prior to the transfer was incapable of degrading oil.8 He claimed patent rights on both the method of producing the bacterium and on the
bacterium itself.9
The Supreme Court approved both patent rights. It characterized
the issue in the case as a "narrow one of statutory interpretation" 10
requiring the Court to construe 35 U.S.C. § 101,11 the federal statute
that defines patentable subject matter. The statute provides: "Whoever
invests or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
12
requirements of this title."
The Court focused on whether Chakrabarty's bacterium constituted "manufacture" or "composition of matter" within the meaning
of the statute and noted that "[i]n choosing such expansive
terms. .. modified by the comprehensive 'any,' Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide scope."' 3 The
Court considered whether Chakrabarty's organism failed the "product
of nature" test, a well-established doctrine that prohibited the patenting of newly discovered but unaltered natural products. 14 In American
Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co. 15 in 1931, the Supreme Court had reinforced this doctrine, holding that an orange, the rind of which had
been treated with borax, could not be patented because the "addition
of borax to the rind of natural fruit does not produce from the raw
material an article for use which possesses a new or distinctive form,
quality, or property."' 6 The Chakrabarty Court rejected the view that
Charkabarty's organism was simply a product of nature, stating that
his claim was "not to a hitherto unknown natural phenomenon, but to
8.

Id. at 305 n.1.

9.

Id. at 305-06.

10.
11.

Id. at 307.
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).

12.

Id.

13.
14.

Chakrabary,447 U.S. at 308.
For a discussion of the history of the product of nature test, see John M. Conley &

Roberte Makowski, Back to the Future: Rethinking the Product of Nature Doctrine as a Barrier to
Biotechnology Patents (Part1), 85J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'v 301, 319-34 (2003).

15.
16.

283 U.S. 1 (1931).
Id. at 11.
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a nonnaturally occurring manufacture or composition of matter-a
17
product of human ingenuity."
The government argued that Congress had not intended living
things to be included within the scope of section 101.18 It claimed that
the enactment of the 1930 Plant Patent Act, 19 which provided patent
protection for certain asexually reproduced plants, and the enactment
of the 1970 Plant Variety Protection Act, 20 which provided the same

protection for certain sexually reproduced plants but specifically excluded bacteria, clearly indicated that Congress believed section 101
did not encompass living things. If section 101 encompassed living
things, the government argued, neither the 1930 Act nor the 1970 Act
21
would have been necessary.
The Court dismissed this argument. It stated that Congress did
not think that plants fell outside of the scope of section 101 because
they were alive, but rather because they were considered "products of
nature," which were non-patentable, and because they were considered not amenable to the "written description" requirement of patent
law under 35 U.S.C. § 112.22 The Court said that the first Patent Act
addressed these concerns, and the second Act was passed to include
sexually reproducing plants, whose utility for identical reproduction
was not recognized in 1930, but had become clear by 1970.23

The Court's opinion in Chakrabarty appears to be a straightforward, uncontroversial application of statutory interpretation techniques. The more radical character of the Court's decision begins to
emerge, however, when one considers the central disagreement between the majority and the dissent in the case.
This disagreement centered on the government's claim that living things should not be considered patentable subject matter unless
Congress indicated explicitly that such patent protection was authorized. 24 Congress, the government argued in its brief, "is best able to
resolve the complex social, economic, and scientific questions frequently involved in [decisions extending the scope of patent law],
and, if an extension is to be made, to tailor the statute to achieve
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309.
See id. at 310-11.
35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164 (2000).
7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2581 (2000).
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310-11.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000); Chakrabarty,447 U.S. at 311-12.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 312-13.
Id. at 314-15.
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precisely the desired ends. '25 This claim appeared to be on strong
ground, particularly because only two years earlier the Court in Parker
v. Flook26 had stated that "we must proceed cautiously when we are
asked to extend patent rights into areas wholly unforeseen by Congress." 2 7 Flook quoted from a 1972 opinion in Deepsouth Packing Co. v.
Laitram Corp.2 8 by Justice White:

"[W]e should not expand patent rights by overruling or modifying
our prior cases construing the patent statutes, unless the argument
for expansion of privilege is based on more than mere inference
from ambiguous statutory language. We would require a clear and
certain signal from Congress before approving the position of a
litigant who, as respondent here, argues that the beachhead of
privilege is wider, and the29area of public use narrower, than courts
had previously thought."

In Chakrabarty, however, the Court was not amenable to such a
claim. Although it was clearly Congress's role to define patentable subject matter, the Court stated, it was entirely within the province of the
judiciary to interpret Congress's intention once in written form, and
there was no ambiguity in section 101 as to the patentability of living
organisms.

30

That the subject matter provision in section 101 did not

explicitly include living organisms was unimportant because "[b] road
general language is not necessarily ambiguous when congressional
objectives require broad terms."'' 1 Unlike in Hook, the Court in
Chakrabartywas untroubled by the possibility that Congress had not
foreseen a particular extension of patentable subject matter. The
Court declared that the government's narrow understanding of section 101 was in tension with the very purposes of patent law: "The
inventions most benefiting mankind are those that 'push back the
frontiers of chemistry, physics, and the like.' . . . Congress employed

broad general language in drafting § 101 precisely because such in-

32
ventions are often unforeseeable."

The Court portrayed its holding as a restrained one, meant to
avoid treading on the province of Congress. In response to claims in
both the government's brief and an amicus brief that the patenting of
25. Brief for the Petitioner at *10, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, No. 79-136, 1980 WL
339757 (U.S. Jan. 4, 1980).
26. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
27. Id. at 596.
28. 406 U.S. 518 (1972).
29. fRook, 437 U.S. at 596 (quoting Deepsouth Packing Co., 406 U.S. at 531).
30. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 316 (quoting Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340
U.S. 147, 154 (1950) (Douglas, J.,concurring)).
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living organisms posed significant ethical, social, and political concerns, 33 the Court declared that the judiciary was without power to
consider such issues:
The briefs present a gruesome parade of horribles .... [But] we
are without competence to entertain these arguments .... The

choice we are urged to make is a matter of high policy for resolution within the legislative process after the kind of investigation,
examination, and study that legislative bodies can provide and
courts cannot. That process involves the balancing of competing
values and interests, which in our democratic system is the business
of elected representatives. Whatever their validity, the contentions
now pressed on us should be addressed to the political branches of
the Congress and the Executive, and not to the
the Government,
34
courts.

In light of its dicta in Hook, statutory language that was far from
clear, and the controversial nature of the issue in the case, the
Chakrabarty Court's tone of modest restraint was curious, as Justice
Brennan's dissent noted. Precisely because of the legislative nature of
the issues involved, the dissent argued, "[W] e must be careful to extend patent protection no further than Congress has provided. ' 3 5 The
dissent disagreed with the majority's construction of the Plant Patent
Acts, arguing that the Acts indicated a congressional understanding
that living things were not patentable, or at least that the Acts were
"signs of legislative attention to the problems of patenting living organisms" without an "affirmative indication of congressional intent that
bacteria be patentable."3 6 Even if there were no indication on the issue from Congress, however, "the courts should leave to Congress the
decisions whether and how far to extend the patent privilege into areas where the common understanding has been that patents are not
available."

3 7

Thus, the dispute between the majority and the dissent in
Chakrabartywas not simply about whether Congress meant for section
101 to apply to living organisms. More significantly, it concerned the
proper roles of the Court and of Congress in advancing the law. The
majority's opinion suggested that, even if Congress had not intended
section 101 to include living organisms, the statute's ambiguity allowed the Court to accommodate changing technology by interpret33.
339757
*6-*31,
34.
35.
36.
37.

Brief for the Petitioner at *16-*21, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, No. 79-136, 1980 WL
(U.S. Jan. 4, 1980); Brief of Amicus Curiae Peoples Business Commission at
Parker v. Chakrabarty, No. 79-136, 1979 WL 200005 (U.S. Dec. 13, 1979).
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 316-17.
Id. at 319 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 319 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 319 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

ing it that way, after which Congress could consider the relevant social
issues and overturn the Court's ruling if necessary. In the dissent's
view, however, the ambiguity of the statute precluded an expansion of
the law; the Court's proper role was necessarily a conservative one.
The dissent felt that only Congress, in its representative capacity and
after careful consideration of the complicated issues involved, could
act to adapt the law to changing times.
Of course, the majority did not explicitly enunciate a progressive
vision, instead portraying its decision as one mandated by existing law.
As described below, however, this conservative presentation of the decision is belied by the relevant precedent and lower court opinions in
the case. In fact, the Court was basically unfettered in deciding the
issue-at the very least, the precedent was ambiguous, and the Court
easily could have taken the more conservative path of holding for the
government. Such a holding would have allowed Congress to include
living organisms within the definition of patentable material if it chose
to do so. Instead, the Court in Chakrabartypositioned itself as an active
player in the advancement of science through the law, pushing the
borders of patent law to the extent that the statutory language would
allow and leaving Congress to override its decision if it felt that the
Court had interpreted the statute incorrectly.
B.

Legal Precedent and Lower Court Opinions

Before the late 1970s, neither the patent office nor the courts
had taken any clear position as to the patentability of living organisms.
As the Patent Commissioner noted in his brief in Chakrabarty, however, "it was the general understanding.. . that legislation was needed
if patent protection was to be extended to microorganisms."3 8 Various

commentators and organizations, including the Patent, Trademark,
and Copyright Law Section of the American Bar Association, had favored legislation to expand patent protection to microorganisms, sug39
gesting that such protection did not already exist.

While some live matter-such as eggs, yeast, plant seeds, and bacterial spores-had been patented, 40 patent applications on microorganisms were uniformly rejected, and certain courts' dicta hinted that
38. Brief for Petitioner at *13, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, No. 79-136, 1980 WL 339757
(U.S. Jan. 4, 1980).
39. Id.
40. See Karen G. Krueger, Note, Building a Better Bacterium: Genetic Engineeringand the
Patent Law After Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 159, 160 (1981).
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they might be unpatentable per se. 4 1 In most cases that raised the

issue of patentability of living organisms, however, courts avoided addressing the issue directly and instead dismissed the applications on
42
other grounds.
In 1948 in Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.,4 3 for example, the Supreme Court considered a patent application for a substance, made up of six strains of bacteria, that was capable of fixing
nitrogen in legumes. 44 Previous attempts to combine bacterial strains
for this purpose had failed due to the inhibitive effects of each strain
on the others, but the Funk Brothers applicant had developed a particular combination of bacteria to avoid this problem. 45 The Court did
not consider the issue of whether bacteria were unpatentable per se,
holding instead that because "[e]ach of the species of root-nodule
bacteria contained in the package infects the same group of leguminous plants which it always infected," the invention was a product of
nature and thus unpatentable.

46

Similarly, in the 1975 In re Merat47 decision, the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals ("CCPA") faced a patent application for a process
that produced "dwarf" hens, which could be mated with "normal"
roosters to produce "normal" heavy meat fowl using less chicken feed
than normally required. 48 The application included a patent claim on
the chickens produced by the method. 49 The court found the patent
specification requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112 unsatisfied in the case,
thus avoiding any consideration of the implications of permitting a
50
patent on a chicken.
Two cases squarely raising the issue of whether living organisms
could be patented made their way through the federal courts at approximately the same time. One of these was Chakrabarty's application, and the second was that of a scientist at Upjohn Research
Laboratory named Malcolm E. Bergy. Bergy's application was for a
patent on the microorganism Streptomyces vellosus, developed to pro41. Id. at 160; see also Guaranty Trust Co. v. Union Solvents Corp., 54 F.2d 400, 410 (D.
Del. 1931); In re Mancy, 499 F.2d 1289, 1294 (C.C.P.A. 1974). The relevant dicta in these
cases is discussed infra. See infra text accompanying notes 70-75.
42. See Krueger, supra note 40, at 160-61.
43. 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
44. Id. at 128-30.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 131.
47. 519 F.2d 1390 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
48. Id. at 1391.
49. Id. at 1393.
50. Id. at 1394.
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duce the antibiotic lincomycin. 5 1 Patent applications on both the
Bergy and Chakrabarty organisms were rejected by the Patent and
Trademark Office ("Patent Office" or "PTO"), and the rejections were
affirmed on appeal by the Board of Appeals of the PTO ("Board").52
The two cases eventually arrived at the CCPA, which at the time was
53
the highest patent court below the Supreme Court.
In Chakrabarty's case, the patent examiner who initially considered the patent application permitted the process patent but rejected
the application for a patent on the bacterium itself. The examiner
stated that the patent was disallowed as a "product of nature" and because living things are not patentable under section 101.54 On appeal,
the Board reversed the examiner on the first holding, finding that the
bacterium in the application was not naturally occurring and thus not
a "product of nature. '5 5 The Board upheld the second stated ground
for the decision, however, finding that Congress did not intend to include living organisms within the scope of section 101.56
The Bergy patent application was also rejected by the patent examiner, on the sole ground that the microorganism was unpatentable
as a "product of nature." 57 The Board seemed to disregard the examiner's rationale for rejection, however, and again based its own rejection of the application on the fact that the microorganism was living
and thus unpatentable under section 101.58 It stated that it had "extensively researched prior court decisions for guidance" as to whether
living things could be patented, but could not find any case on point,
"other than possibly non-controlling dicta. '59 The Board went on to
find that "only those categories of subject matter specifically enumerated in the statute are patentable and a living organism does not fall
within the scope of any of those categories listed." 60 The Board noted
51.

In re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031,

1032 (C.C.P.A. 1977)

("Bergy

r);

Ananda M.

Chakrabarty, Diamond v. Chakrabarty: A HistoricalPerspective, in PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAw:
CASES AND MATERIALS 791-96 (Donald Chisum et al., eds., 2004).

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
cluded
1031.

Chakrabarty, supra note 51, at 793.
Id. at 793-94.
In re Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d 40, 42 (C.C.P.A. 1978) ("Chakrabarty 1").
Id.
Id.
Bergy 1, 563 F.2d at 1031.
Id. at 1033. Note that the Board opinions in the Bergy and Chakrabarty cases inlarge portions of repeated material. Chakrabarty I, 571 F.2d 40; Bergy I, 563 F.2d

59. Bergy I, 563 F.2d at 1033.
60. Id. at 1033.
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that allowing bacteria to be patented might lead to the patenting of
61
more complex life forms.
The Bergy patent appeal was the first to reach the CCPA, which
reversed in a three to two decision. 62 The court began by flatly rejecting the suggestion that the microorganism was a product of nature, finding the evidence "incontrovertible" that the microorganism
was not found in nature. 63 As for the issue of whether living things
could be patented, the court labeled it a question of first impression
64
and briefly reviewed potentially relevant precedent.
The court first considered In re Mancy,65 a 1974 case in which it
had addressed the patentability of a method of producing an antibiotic by aerobically cultivating a strain of Streptomyces birfurcus.66 In
Mancy, the court overruled a finding of obviousness by the lower
court, 67 pointing to a 1973 case, In re Kuehl,68 in which the non-obviousness requirement had been deemed satisfied. 6 9 In rejecting any
significant differences between the two cases, the Mancy court admitted that in Kuehl
the novel zeolite used as a catalyst in the claimed hydrocarbon
cracking processes was itself the subject of allowed claims in the
application. Here appellants not only have no allowed claim to the
novel strain of Streptomyces used in their process but would, we presume (without deciding), be unable to obtain such a claim because
the strain, while new in the sense that it is not shown by any art of
record, is, as we understand it, a "product of nature." 70
This dictum had been interpreted in the past as indicating that
living things were not patentable, since it suggested that the appellants would not have been permitted to claim a patent on the microorganism at issue. The CCPA rejected this reading in Bergy, however,
stating that "we now make it explicit that the thought underlying our
presumption that Mancy could not have obtained a claim to the strain
61. Id. at 1033-34 (referring specifically to the potential patentability of honeybees
and new varieties of animals).
62. See id. at 1039.
63. Id. at 1035.
64. See id. at 1035-37.
65. 499 F.2d 1289 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
66. Id. at 1290.
67. This holding was based in 35 U.S.C. § 103, under which a patent application
should be denied if "the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and
the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the
time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
subject matter pertains." 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000).
68. 475 F.2d 658 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
69. In re Mancy, 499 F.2d at 1292.
70. Id. at 1294.
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of microorganism he had described was simply that it lacked novelty,"
71
and in any case "our dictum was ill-considered."
The CCPA in Bergy also addressed dictum in Guaranty Trust Co. of
New York v. Union Solvents Corp.-7 2 In that case, which involved a patent
application for a fermentation process using bacteria, the Delaware
district court stated:
Lastly, the defendant contends that the invention of the Weizmann
patent is unpatentable since it is for the life process of a living organism. Were the patent for bacteria per se, a different situation
would be presented. As before stated, the patent is not for bacteria
per se. It is for a fermentation process employing bacteria discovered by Weizmann
under conditions set forth in the specification
73

and claims.

Again, this statement suggested that living things were unpatentable because it distinguished between permissible patenting of a pro-

cess and impermissible patenting of the living organism itself. The
court in Bergy rejected the relevance of this dictum out of hand, however, testily declaring it "a trite observation of minimal magnitude as
precedent, dealing with a non-issue on which no opinion was expressed. '74 Finding the proffered precedent on the patentability of
living organisms unconvincing, the CCPA concluded that "the fact
that microorganisms, as distinguished from chemical compounds, are
alive is a distinction without legal significance and that disposes of the
board's ground of rejection and the sole reason for refusal of a patent
75
argued by the solicitor."
In Chakrabarty's appeal to the CCPA, the Court relied upon its
reasoning in Bergy and reversed in another three to two decision. 76 In
a strongly worded concurrence, Chief Judge Markey added that section 101 "is not ambiguous. No Congressional intent to limit patents
to dead inventions lurks in the lacuna of the statute, and there is no
'77
grave or compelling circumstance requiring us to find it there.
In 1979, the Supreme Court granted the Commissioner of Patent
and Trademark's petition for certiorari in both Bergy and Chakrabarty,
then vacated both judgments and remanded "for further consideration in light of Parker v. Hook."78 Flook, which had recently been de71.

Berg 1, 563 F.2d 1031, 1036 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (emphasis omitted).

72.

54 F.2d 400 (D. Del. 1931).

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 410.
Bergy I, 563 F.2d at 1036.
Id. at 1038.
In re Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d 40, 43 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
Id. at 44 (Markey, J., concurring).
Parker v. Bergy, 438 U.S. 902 (1978).
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cided, involved a patent application on a method for improving
systems related to catalytic conversion, in which the only new feature
compared to previous methods was a particular mathematical
formula. 79 The Hook Court held that the method was not patentable
because mathematical formulas may not be patented.8 0 Beyond the
warning that "we must proceed cautiously when we are asked to extend patent rights into areas wholly unforeseen by Congress," 8 1 and
the related statement from Justice White's opinion in Deepsouth Packing,8 2 the Court's decision in Hook had no clear relevance to the facts
of Chakrabarty and Bergy. It is thus likely that the Supreme Court, in
vacating and remanding the Chakrabartyand Bergy decisions, was referring the CCPA to these cautionary notes that urged a conservative
reading of section 101.
On remand, the CCPA wrote a joint decision for both cases, affirming its previous rulings. 8 3 The court reviewed the facts and holding of Flook in detail and, despite the implication of the Supreme
Court's remand, found the case to be irrelevant, concluding, "The
only thing we see in common in these appeals and in Flook is that they
all involve § 101."84 The CCPA rejected the claim that the Court's remand was based on Rook's cautionary language, stating:
We are not faced with a litigant urging upon us a construction of
§ 101 which is at odds with established precedent. Rather, we deal
with a case of first impression. Not having been asked to make a
change in existing law or to overrule or modify any case or to expand any right 8given
by Congress, we need in this case no signal
5
from that body.
After reviewing the reasons for its previous holdings and further
explicating those rationales, the CCPA found both Chakrabarty's and
Bergy's organisms to be patentable. 8 6 The Patent Office again appealed the ruling and the Supreme Court granted certiorari,8 7 but the
Bergy lawyers withdrew their application for a product patent on their
antibiotic-producing microorganism before the Court heard oral argument. 8 8 Thus, in 1980, the Supreme Court dismissed the Bergy ap79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978).
Id. at 594.
Id. at 596.
Id.
In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A. 1979) ("Bergy IT).

84.

Id. at 964.

85.

Id. at 966-67.

86.

Id. at 987.

87.
88.

Diamond v. Bergy, 444 U.S. 924 (1979).
See Chakrabarty, supra note 51, at 793-94.
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peal as moot8 9 and announced its holding only as to Chakrabarty's
claim, affirming the ruling of the CCPA.90
The legal precedent and the lower court opinions in Chakrabarty
provide a revealing glimpse of the legal case for patentability of living
organisms at the time of the decision and demonstrate the inaccuracy
of the Court's portrayal of its holding as one clearly mandated by law.
Before the Chakrabartycase, no court had stated that living organisms
were patentable and conventional wisdom within the bar as well as
somewhat ambiguous court dicta suggested the opposite. 9 1 The Supreme Court only two years earlier in Flook had cautioned against expanding the boundaries of patent law without clear congressional
authorization, and the Court's remand of the Bergy and Chakrabarty
cases in 1979 with a direction to consider Flook suggests that the Court
was considering just such a problem in those cases. The Court in
Chakrabartywas faced with an issue of first impression, ambiguous statutory language, and at least an arguable claim, based on the two Plant
Acts, that Congress did not intend living things to be patentable. The
Court easily could have crafted an opinion holding against
Chakrabarty, thus avoiding the significant- controversy-which the
Court certainly must have anticipated-that followed the decision.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Chakrabarty was therefore far from a
basic exercise in statutory interpretation; it was a conscious assertion
of judicial authority to advance the law with changing times.
C.

The Public Response

The controversial nature of the Court's holding in Chakrabartyis
confirmed by media reports and legal press following the decision,
which describe a flurry of public praise and criticism of the Court.
These accounts also indicate a public recognition that both the majority and dissenting opinions in Chakrabarty invited a congressional response. Media reports suggested an expectation that a legislative
response might be forthcoming.
In a June 17, 1980 article reporting the decision, Linda Greenhouse of the New York Times wrote that "the opinion was hailed and
denounced in the sweeping language that has characterized much of
89. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980) (remanding with directions to dismiss appeal as moot).
90. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 318 (1980).
91. See Brief for the Petitioner at *13, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, No. 79-136, 1980 WL
339757 (U.S. Jan. 4, 1980).
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the debate since the Court agreed last October to decide the issue." 92
The article quoted the People's Business Commission, a non-profit organization that had filed an amicus brief in the case, as stating that
"'[t]he Brave New World that Aldous Huxley warned of is now
here.'"93 The article also quoted Genentech, Inc., a genetic engineering company that had filed an amicus brief, as proclaiming that
"'[t]he Court has assured this country's technology future.'" 9 4 The
same day, the Washington Post reported that the decision was "one of
95
the most controversial of the past decade."
In a 1984 article about the Supreme Court's most recent opinions
related to new technology, Fred Barbash of the Washington Post wrote
of the assertiveness of the Chakrabarty Court's vision of its role with
respect to Congress. 96 The article described the decision as a sign of
the Court's new willingness to meet the demands of science by expanding legal protection, even absent a specific congressional
mandate:
Slowly and reluctantly, the justices are beginning to confront novel
legal questions arising from the rush of high technology. And their
most recent opinions indicate that they have no intention of standing in the way of this rush without explicit instructions from
Congress.
It is not the place of the federal judiciary to put the brakes on these
developments, the court is saying, whether confronted with demands that it save the entertainment industry, as in the Sony case,
or the world, as in [Chakrabarty].97
In articles both favorable to and opposed to the Court's ruling in
Chakrabarty,press and legal writers recognized the importance of Congress's next move in determining the decision's ultimate legacy. In the
ChristianScience Monitor, Robert Cowen wrote shortly after Chakrabarty
that the holding left the real decision as to the patentability of living
organisms to "society as a whole," via the mouthpiece of Congress: 98
92. Linda Greenhouse, Science May Patent New Forms of Life,Justices Rule,5 to 4: Dispute
on Bacteria: Decision Assists Industry in Bioengieenng in a Variety of Projects, N.Y. TIMES, June
17, 1980, at Al.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Fred Barbash, Laboratory Life Forms Patentable; High Court Rules, 5-4, Genetic Work
Protected by Law, WASH. PosT, June 17, 1980, at Al.
96. Fred Barbash, Supreme Court Chooses Not to Stem the Tide of High Technology, WASH.
POST,

Jan. 22, 1984, at A5.

97.
98.

Id.
Robert C. Cowen, Gene-Splicing: Court Tosses Issue to Public, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONI-

TOR, June

18, 1980, at 1, 9.

UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

In ruling that a "man-made" microbe is patentable, the US Supreme Court has resolved a narrow legal question and issued an
awesome challenge.
The people of the United States, through their elected representatives and legislative bodies, must decide the extent to which they
believe humans should seek to manipulate organic life at its fundamental level and under what restraints this 99should be done. The
courts cannot make that decision for them.
In a case note on the decision, the Harvard Law Review praised
the Court's willingness to take an assertive stand in broadening the
law to accommodate new technologies, but noted that Congress had
much work to do in the wake of the decision:
Whether microorganisms should be patentable is a policy judgment that must be considered in light of the efficacy and purpose
of the patent system itself. Because even the important patent issues arising in connection with microbiological research are ancillary to far broader scientific, social, and ethical issues, they should
await comprehensive congressional review of microbiological and
genetic research.10 0
Media reports of the time expressed the general sense that
Chakrabarty"[left] open more questions than it answer[ed]," and that
the Court's decision was simply a first step in an area that Congress
would ultimately mold through detailed legislation.1 0 1
D.

Patent Activity After Chakrabarty

At the time of the Supreme Court's decision in Chakrabarty, 114
patent applications involving new life forms were pending in the PTO,
and new applications were coming in every day. 10 2 Following the decision, the PTO began to grant applications on microorganisms such as
Chakrabarty's, although these grants were delayed for several months
due to processing difficulties. 10 3 It remained unclear whether animals
could be patented, however, and the PTO stated no position on this
matter for several years.
The issue was finally resolved in 1987, when Exparte Allen'0 4 came
before the Board. The case involved a patent application for polyploid
oysters (oysters with three sets of chromosomes rather than two),
99. Id. at 1.
100. Case Note, Patentabilityof Living Microorganisms:Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 94 HARv.
L. REv. 261, 269 (1980).
101. Genetic Patents: Less Than Meets the Eye, Bus. WL_, June 30, 1980, at 48.
102. New Life Forms: A ClearRoad Ahead?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 30, 1980, at 34.
103. See Stacy V. Jones, Patents:Delays on Life-Form Protection, N.Y. TIMEs, June 21, 1980,
§1, at 30.
104. 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1987).
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which were sterile and grew to be larger than ordinary oysters, an appealing trait for commercial use. 10 5 The patent examiner rejected the
application because the oysters were living organisms, 10 6 and the
Board reversed this finding, stating that Diamond v. Chakrabarty had
held decisively that living organisms were patentable. 10 7 In broad language, the Board declared that "[t] he issue, in our view, in determining whether the claimed subject matter is patentable under § 101 is
08
simply whether the subject matter is made by man."
The Board's decision in Ex parteAllen forced the PTO to declare
its policy, and soon after the holding, in April 1987, it released an
announcement stating explicitly that multi-cellular organisms, including animals, were now patentable subject matter. 109 In the announcement, the PTO noted that humans were excluded from this policy
based on a constitutional prohibition 10 -presumably under the Thirteenth Amendment's slavery provision. The announcement appeared
in the Official Gazette of the Patent Office:
The Patent and Trademark Office now considers non-naturally occurring non-human multi-cellular living organisms, including animals, to be patentable subject matter within the scope of 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 .

. .

. A claim directed to or including within its scope a

human being will not be considered to be patentable subject matter within 35 U.S.C. § 101. The grant of a limited, but exclusive
property right in a human being is prohibited by the
Constitution.' 11
With this new policy, the United States became the first country
in the world to permit the patenting of animals. 112 Unsurprisingly, the
change was met with severe disapproval by some groups, and a coalition of animal rights and public policy groups formed almost immedi3
ately to block the change."
On April 12, 1988, the first patent on a living multi-cellular organism was issued to Harvard University for the "Harvard mouse," a
mouse genetically engineered to develop a type of cancer useful as a
105. Id. at 1425; EdmundJ. Sease, From Microbes, to Corn Seeds, to Oysters, to Mice: Patentability of New Life Forms, 38 DRAKE L. REv. 551, 563 (1988-1989).
106. Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1426.
107. See id.
108. Id. The Board ultimately rejected the oyster patent application on other grounds.
Id. at 1427-29.
109. See Animals-Patentability, 1077 OFF. GAz. PAT. OFRICE 18, 24 (Apr. 21, 1987).

110.
111.
112.
Al.
113.

Id.
Id.
Keith Schneider, New Animal Forms Will Be Patented, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1987, at
See id. at D15.
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model for human breast cancer. 114 Several law suits challenging the
action were filed, including Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg,115 a suit
by animal husbandry groups, animal rights groups, and farmers claiming that the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks had failed to
comply with various requirements of the Administrative Procedure
Act in promulgating the new animal patent policy. 116 The Federal Cir11 7
cuit dismissed the suit for lack of standing.
After granting a patent on the Harvard mouse, the PTO did not
approve any further animal patents for nearly five years. 1 8 The
agency did not offer an explanation for this unofficial moratorium,
but as a New York Times reporter put it, the agency "apparently got cold
feet" in response to the controversy surrounding the Harvard
mouse.' 1 9 In 1992, the PTO resumed issuance of such patents, authorizing three patents on mice that, like the Harvard mouse, were genetically engineered to provide models for human disease. 120 Scores of
animal patent approvals followed. 12 1 The rush of animal patenting in
the early 1990s raised public awareness of the issue, and Congress,
which first had paid surprisingly litile attention to Chakrabarty,began
to take notice.
H.

The Congressional Response

As described in Part I, there was a public expectation that, after
Chakrabarty, Congress would evaluate the permissibility of patenting
living organisms. Both the majority and dissent in the case suggested
that Congress should consider the issue. The majority declared that
the policy repercussions of its decision were "a matter of high policy
for resolution within the legislative process after the kind of investigation, examination, and study that legislative bodies can provide and
courts cannot.' 2 2 Likewise, the dissent argued that "the courts should
leave to Congress the decisions whether and how far to extend the
114. See Malcolm Gladwell, Mouse Patent May Bolster Research Efforts; New Genetic Techniques Could Reduce Drug Costs, WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 1988, at Fl.
115. 932 F.2d 920 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see also Suit Seeks to Halt Patentingof Genetically Bred
Animals, L.A. TIMES, July 29, 1988, pt. 1, at 22.
116. Id. at 922.

117.

Quigg, 932 F.2d at 939.

118. See Edmund L. Andrews, U.S. Resumes GrantingPatents on Genetically Altered Animals,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1993, at Al.

119.

Id. at D5.

120.
121.

See id. at Al.
See Eliot Marshall, A Deluge of Patents Creates Legal Hassles for Research, 288

255, 256 (2000).
122. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 317 (1980).
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patent privilege."'123 Media reports of the time noted the possibility of
a congressional response, and commentators suggested that the
Chakrabarty Court had "issued an awesome challenge" to the
24
legislature.'
The obvious question, then, is whether Congress did respond,
and if so, what form the response took. This section gives detailed
consideration to the congressional action (or lack thereof) related to
the patentability of living organisms that followed the Chakrabarty
decision.
A.

In the Wake of Chakrabarty

A week after the Chakrabarty decision, a meeting, sponsored in
part by the House Committee on Science and Technology, was organized in Washington to discuss the significance of the decision.' 2 5 Patent lawyers, scientists, and members of Congress all voiced their views
at the meeting. Representative George Brown, a Democrat from California and the chairman of the House Science, Research, and Technology Subcommittee, cautioned that many members of the public
had "genuine and deeply felt" apprehensions about the type of research Chakrabartywould encourage.1 2 6 Jonathan King, a professor of
biology at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, argued that Congress should pass legislation explicitly prohibiting the patenting of living organisms. 127 Representative Robert Drinan, a Democrat from
Massachusetts, disagreed, arguing that Congress should wait and learn
more about the technology before it acted, adding that "[w] e make
28
enough mistakes on matters we think we understand."'
While the courts and many pundits seem to have expected a legislative evaluation of Chakrabarty to follow the decision, congressional
observers suggested that Congress was unlikely to act in the near future. A week after the decision, U.S. News & World Report noted that
although the ChakrabartyCourt "left the door open for Congress to
amend the laws and set regulatory policy on the new research technology[,] ...congressional sources indicate that no changes in the law to
upset the Supreme Court ruling are imminent." 129 Similarly, Chemical
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 319 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Cowen, supra note 98, at 1.
Fresh Debate Over the Life-form Ruling, CHEMICAL WK, Aug. 6, 1980, at 47.
Id.
Id.
Id.
New Life Forms: A Clear Road Ahead?, U.S. NEWS & WoRLD REP.,June 30,1980, at 34.
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Week reported that while "[t] he high court left open the door to some
form of ban on patents for living organisms[,] ... Congressional observers... consider remote any move by Congress to change the pat130
ent law in this direction."
These predictions proved to be accurate-no noteworthy reports,
debates, or legislation related to Chakrabarty emerged from Congress
in the first seven years following the decision. This lack of congressional interest was notable in light of the public controversy surrounding the decision and the reference to important policy implications in
the amicus briefs and opinions in the case. It was only after the Board
interpreted Chakrabarty to permit animal patenting in Ex parte Allen
that significant legislative interest in the decision emerged.
B. After Ex parte Allen
Just as Chakrabarty had, Ex parte Allen and the PTO's subsequent
announcement that it would approve animal patents let loose a storm
of protest. Religious leaders and animal welfare groups argued that
patenting animals was unethical and would damage humanity's relationship with nature, while farmers' organizations worried that patents for superior breeds of animals resulting from genetic
engineering would be owned and controlled by a few large companies. 13 1 As a result, several members of Congress adopted the
Chakrabartyissue as a central political cause.
1. An Early Bill and the House Subcommittee Hearings
In May of 1987, just one month after the Board's decision in Ex
parte Allen and almost a year before the patenting of the Harvard
mouse, Senator Mark Hatfield, a Republican from Oregon, proposed
an amendment to a supplementary appropriations bill, prohibiting
the use of appropriated funds for the patenting of genetically modified animals. 13 2 The amendment, which would have prevented the
PTO from considering or granting patent applications for animals un130. Patent Ruling Won't Shift Gene R&D Goals, CHEMICAL WK., June 25, 1980, at 57.
131. See PhilipJ. Hilts, The Business of ManipulatingLife; U.S. Decision on Genetic Engineering Prompts Debate on Ethics, Fears of Monopoly, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 1987, at A21.
132. S.Amend. 245, 100th Cong. (1987), amending Supplemental Appropriations Act,
Pub. L. No. 100-71, 101 Stat. 391 (1987), in THOMAS, LEGISLATIVE INFORMATION ON THE
INTERNET, at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/search.html (last accessed Apr. 12, 2005) (to

get bill status information (1) choose "summary and status information about bills and
resolutions"; (2) click 100th Congress; (3) enter "S.Amdt 245"; and (4) click search).
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til 1988, was adopted by the Senate.1 3 3 Perhaps hoping that compromise would ease political tensions, the PTO voluntarily agreed not to
patent any animals through the 1987 fiscal year before the3 amend4
ment could be considered in the House of Representatives.'
While the appropriations amendment was still pending in June,
Representative Robert Kastenmeier, a Democrat from Wisconsin, initiated a set of hearings on the subject through the House Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice
("CCLAJ") within the Committee on the Judiciary. Representative Kastenmeier announced that the purpose of the hearings, which were
entitled "Patents and the Constitution: Transgenic Animals," was "to
assess the myriad of questions which arise from decisions to issue patents to genetically altered plants and animals,"' 35 including "moral
and philosophic questions."13 6 The hearings spanned four days and
produced a 931-page record. 13 7 Over thirty witnesses, including patent
lawyers, law and biology professors, religious leaders, bioethics experts, anti-genetic engineering activists, biotechnology company representatives, and farmers' advocates gave testimony at the hearings
and discussed both legal and policy considerations relevant to the pat138
enting of animals.
At the hearings, Representative Kastenmeier expressed a lack of
confidence in both the Supreme Court's decision in Chakrabaryand
in the Patent and Trademark Commissioner's ability to interpret section 101 appropriately. 13 9 He questioned the authority of the
Chakrabartydecision, finding it "troubling" that "we tend to interpret
[Chakrabarty] as the law of the land," despite the fact that " [i] t was not
only a five to four decision, but two members of the majority are not
even on the Court now." 140 Thus, "even though it remains the law,
133. S.Amend. 245, 100th Cong. (1987), inTHOMAs, LEGISLATIVE INFORMATION ON THE
INTERNET, at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/search.html (last accessed Apr. 12, 2005) (to
get bill status information: (1) choose "Summary and Status Information About Bills and
Resolutions"; (2) click "100th Congress"; (3) type "S.Amend. 245"; (4) click "Search"; and,
(5) click "CRS Summary").
134. See 136 CONG. REc. 2564 (1990) (statement of Sen. Hatfield) ("[T]he [appropriations bill] amendment was passed in the Senate and the PTO agreed not to patent any
animals through fiscal year 1987.").
135. Patents and the Constitution: Transgenic Animals: Hearing on Supplemental Appropriations Act Before the House Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice, 100th
Cong. 2 (1987), at 1 [hereinafter Patents and the Constitution].
136. Id. at 2.
137. Patents and the Constitution, supra note 135.
138. See id.
139. See Patents and the Constitution, supra note 135, at 2, 23, 31, 197.
140. Id. at 23.
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[the Chakrabarty] view is not shared by everybody," Representative Kastenmeier stated. 141 In response to a witness who hoped that Congress
would overturn Chakrabarty,however, Representative Kastenmeier was
not supportive, stating clearly, "As far as microorganisms is [sic] concerned, that is already a lost cause .... I do not think that Chakrabarty
will be repealed judicially or otherwise." 142 Representative Kastenmeier suggested that Congress could have properly evaluated and
perhaps reacted to the ruling in Chakrabarty if it had responded earlier. He also contended that if Congress did not review the implications of the PTO announcement immediately, that opportunity might
pass in the same way:
[W]hen it was a question of microorganisms in the Chakrabarty
case, people sort of shrugged their shoulders. But as it has now
ascended to mammals and vertebrates, more people are concerned
about implications, and if somebody does not look at it now ...
then it may be too late.
At least I would want to feel that we made a conscious decision in
1987 ...

that we have not allowed policies to eventuate which we

cannot cope with later on....
Speak now or forever
143 hold your piece [sic], so to speak; that is the
position we are in.
One of Representative Kastenmeier's primary concerns appeared
to be patenting of human beings. Although the PTO had announced
its position that humans were unpatentable under the Constitution,
Representative Kastenmeier suggested that a future administration
could change that view unless Congress enacted a ban on the patenting of human beings. 1 "
Other speakers at the hearing argued both for and against congressional legislation on animal patents. Dr. Tegtmayer, the Assistant
Commissioner for Patents at the PTO, stated that while she commended the chairman of the Subcommittee for holding the hearing
and believed that animal patentability "is a good area to have a dialogue in," the PTO position "at the present time is that we do not see
any particular need to address this issue with legislation." 145 Reid Adler, a patent attorney who argued for an expansive interpretation of
section 101, disagreed, claiming that the PTO Commissioner was
overly conservative and had "a poor track record in supporting novel,
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

492-93.
198.
25.
31.
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frontier technologies."1 46 He claimed that the Commissioner had refused to apply Chakrabarty appropriately until the Board forced him
to. He also recommended that "Congress require annual reports from
the PTO on the Commissioner's administrative determinations under
§ 101 of any types of subject matter that are excluded from patentability." 14 7 At the same time, other witnesses argued vehemently that Congress should restrict the Patent Office's ability to expfind the category
148
of patentable subject matter.

The 1987 House Subcommittee hearings did not produce one
clear policy proposal, but they provided a wealth of information about
the competing claims and values involved in the animal patent controversy and demonstrated that Congress was willing to carefully address
the policy issues surrounding Chakrabarty.In a sense, the hearings had
bolstered the position of the Chakrabartymajority; they appeared to be
precisely the type of "investigation, examination, and study" that the
Chakrabartymajority had left to Congress, suggesting that the legisla149
ture was uniquely capable in that role.
In the seven years following the hearings, ten bills prohibiting or
regulating animal patenting were proposed in the House and Senate,
but none passed, and most never emerged from committee. New proposals ceased not long after the PTO resumed approving animal patent applications in 1992, and the issue seemed dead until quite
recently, when the human cloning controversy revived the Chakrabarty
controversy in relation to the patenting of human beings. Although
the proposed bills (described below) differed from one another in
several respects, the comments of the Representatives and Senators
supporting them were strikingly similar. Most of the speakers suggested that Congress had disregarded its obligation to make law in the
area related to Chakrabarty,and many explicitly denounced both the
Supreme Court and the PTO for inappropriately co-opting the legislative role.
2.

Proposals in the Late 1980s

In August of 1987, Representative Charles Rose, a Democrat from
North Carolina, proposed a bill to impose a two-year moratorium on
the patenting of "animals altered through genetic engineering tech146. Id. at 164.
147. Id.
148. See, e.g., id. at 484-94 (testimony of'Jeremy Rifkin, President of the Foundation for
Economic Trends).
149. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 317 (1980).
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nology." 150 The CCLAJ Subcommittee rejected this legislation the following year.15 1 In February of 1988, Senator Hatfield proposed an
almost identical moratorium bill. 152 Presenting the bill in the Senate,
Senator Hatfield contrasted the executive role of the Patent Office
with the legislative role of Congress:
[T]he Patent Office itself admits that it does not take ethical or
moral considerations into account when assessing an application
for a patent. It is, I believe, the responsibility of Congress to fully
consider what kind of technological creativity we wish to encourage
through the patenting process, and I believe the giant leap to
animal patenting provides
1 53 us with the specific example we need to
conduct such a debate.
In Senator Hatfield's view, Congress should consider "the ethical
implications of the creation, and exclusive rights to, an animal never
before existing in nature. 1 54 He cautioned that he did not wish to
halt genetic engineering, a "revolutionary science [that] may produce
results nothing short of miraculous," but only to provide time for Con155
gress to fulfill its duty by carefully considering the issues involved.
Senator Hatfield's bill was referred to the Senate Subcommittee on
156
Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks, where it failed.
In June of 1988, three months after the patenting of the Harvard
mouse, Representative Kastenmeier introduced a bill proposing a different response to the PTO's animal patenting announcement. The
bill did not prohibit the patenting of animals, but declared that
human beings were not patentable subject matter and, to protect
farmers' interests, that a farmer would not be guilty of patent infringement based on reproducing, using, or selling patented transgenic
150. H.R. 3119, 100th Cong. (1987), in THOMAS, LEGISLATIVE INFORMATION ON THE INTERNET, at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/search.html (last accessed Apr. 12, 2005) (to get
bill status information: (1) choose "Summary and Status Information About Bills and Resolutions"; (2) click "100th Congress"; (3) type "H.R. 3119"; (4) click "Search"; and (5) click
"CRS Summary").
151. Marianne Lavelle, just Whose Life Is It, Anyway?, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 15, 1988, at 3, 20.
152. S.2111, 100th Cong. (1988), in THOMAS, LEGISLATIVE INFORMATION ON THE INTERNET, at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/search.html (last accessed Apr. 12, 2005) (to get
bill status information: (1) choose "Summary and Status Information About Bills and Resolutions"; (2) click "100th Congress"; (3) type "S.2111"; (4) click "Search"; and (5) click
"CRS Summary").
153. 143 CONG. REc. 2677 (1988) (statement of Sen. Hatfield).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See S.2111, 100th Cong. (1988), in THOMAS, LEGISLATIVE INFORMATION ON THE
INTERNET, at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/search.html (last accessed Apr. 12, 2005) (to
get bill status information: (1) choose "Summary and Status Information About Bills and
Resolutions"; (2) click "100th Congress"; (3) type "S.2111"; and (4) click "Search").
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farm animals. 157 On the floor of the House, Representative Kastenmeier stated that the bill represented the conclusion of the extensive hearings held by the CCLAJ Subcommittee and run by him in
1987 and that it provided a better solution than the various moratorium bills suggested by his colleagues. 158 Representative Kastenmeier
argued that no moratorium bill was likely to pass in Congress and
that, regardless, a moratorium "does not answer the fundamental
questions." 159
Representative Carlos Moorhead, a Republican from California
who also spoke in favor of the bill, argued that, based on the information provided by the hearings, there was no evidence that research
involving transgenic animals was dangerous or unethical. 160 But if at
some point such research did become dangerous, he argued that
"Congress has the ability to monitor research and development in this
area and as soon as we detect abuse we can move in and remedy the
situation." 16 1 Thus Representative Moorhead, like Senator Hatfield
and Representative Kastenmeier, believed that Congress had an obligation to actively monitor the Chakrabartyissue. Another Congressman
who rose to speak in favor of the bill, Representative Hamilton Fish of
New York, a Republican, suggested that the public did not want a total
ban on the patenting of genetically engineered animals, noting that a
Public Perception Survey had found that "83 percent [of those
polled] favor using genetically engineered organisms on a small scale
for medical research" and "42 percent favored use on a large scale
162
basis."
Representative Kastenmeier's bill passed in the House in September of 1988 and was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee, but
the Senate never considered the measure. 163 Representative Kastenmeier introduced the bill again in 1989,164 stating, "It is my hope
that given the extensive work done on this issue by the House that the
Senate will turn to [it] early this Congress."1 6 5 The bill was referred to
the House Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Ad157.
men, or
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

H.R. 4970, 100th Cong. (1988). The bill prohibited the selling of germ cells, seembryos of such farm animals. Id. at 2.
See 134 CONG. REc. 23,565-66 (1988).
Id. at 23,566.
Id. at 23,567.
Id.
Id.
See 135 CONG. Rc. 5165 (1989) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
H.R. 1556, 101st Cong. (1989).
135 CONG. REc. 5165 (1989).
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ministration of Justice in March of 1989.166 The Subcommittee held
hearings on the subject in September, but the bill never emerged
167
from the Subcommittee.
At about the same time, Representative Benjamin Cardin, a Democrat from Maryland, proposed another bill imposing a two-year moratorium on the granting of animal patents, with a new exception for
"animals the commercialization of which is subject to a Federal regulatory review and approval process." 168 Representative Cardin, like Senator Hatfield a year earlier, emphasized the distinct roles of the PTO
and Congress and suggested that Congress had derogated from its obligation to decide significant policy issues:
It is the Congress' duty, not PTO's, to determine whether living
organisms, like plants and animals, are patentable. Congress saw
the need for this type of active involvement [in enacting the Plant
Patent Acts]. With regard to the patenting of animals, however, it
was the PTO, not Congress, that decided in 1987 that nonhuman
animals constituted patentable subject matter. The PTO stepped in
to fill the void.169
But it is time for Congress to become more involved
in the debate.
Representative Cardin's declaration that it is Congress's "duty" to
decide whether living organisms are patentable implied a subtle criticism of the Supreme Court's holding in Chakrabarty,which in essence
decided this question without congressional input. Representative
Cardin stated, "I believe we have reached the point at which we must
' 70
examine whether our patent system is keeping up with technology."
Representative Cardin's moratorium bill, like those that had preceded
171
it, failed to emerge from the House Subcommittee.
Three months later, in February of 1990, Senator Hatfield proposed another moratorium bill in the Senate, this time for a five-year
span,1 72 declaring, "[T]he patenting of animals blurs the distinction
H.R. 1556, 101st Cong. (1989), in THOMAS, LEGISLATIVE INFORMATION ON THE INat http://thomas.loc.gov/home/search.html (last accessed Apr. 12, 2005) (to get
bill status information: (1) choose "Summary and Status Information About Bills and Resolutions"; (2) click "101st Congress"; (3) type "H.R. 1556"; and (4) click "Search").
166.

TERNET,

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id.
H.R. 3247, 101st Cong. (1989).
135 CONG. REc. 20,226 (1989).
Id.
See H.R. 3247, 101st Cong. (1988), in THOMAS, LEGISLATIVE INFORMATION ON THE
INTERNET, at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/search.html (last accessed Apr. 12, 2005) (to
get bill status information: (1) choose "Summary and Status Information About Bills and
Resolutions"; (2) click "101st Congress"; (3) type "H.R. 3247"; and (4) click "Search").
172. S. 2169, 101st Cong. (1990).
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between man's work and God's work." 173 Like Representative Cardin,
Senator Hatfield emphasized the obligation of Congress to make policy determinations, and his rebuke of the Supreme Court and the Patent Office was strongly worded. He argued that traditionally living
things were appropriately not considered to be patentable under the
law because they were "in the public ownership."'1 74 Unfortunately, according to Senator Hatfield, the Supreme Court had reversed that position in Chakrabarty, despite a plea by the dissent to leave such issues
to the Congress. 175 Senator Hatfield asserted that the Patent Office
then made things worse by "unilaterally extending the holding in
Chakrabarty" to permit animal patenting. 176 In his view, this "represents a vast, unique and deeply troubling usurpation of Congressional
authority... [and] denies the public the traditional legislative process
for the protection of their rights." 177 Thus, Senator Hatfield blatantly
declared that the courts and the PTO had encroached upon congressional authority: "My legislation to rescind this patent office decision
simply maintains the status quo, by returning major patenting decisions to the correct and traditional forum, Congress."1 78 Like his ear79
lier proposal, Senator Hatfield's bill failed in committee.'
Just as those congressmen in favor of a moratorium on animal
patenting persisted in proposing a new bill each year, Representative
Kastenmeier continued to argue for his alternative proposal allowing
the patenting of living organisms. In September of 1990, he reintroduced his bill in almost identical form, as part of the larger Patent
Competitiveness and Technological Innovation Act of 1990.180 The
bill was referred to the House Judiciary Committee, which produced a
report in October.' 8 ' The report stated that the bill would provide
173.

136 CONG. REc. 2564 (1990).
174. Id. at 2565.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See S. 2169, 101st Cong. (1990), in THOMAS, LEGISLATIVE INFORMATION ON THE INTERNET, at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/search.html (last accessed Apr. 12, 2005) (to get
bill status information: (1) choose "Summary and Status Information About Bills and Resolutions"; (2) click "101st Congress"; (3) type "S. 2169"; and (4) click "Search").
180.

H.R. 5598, 101st Cong. (1990), in THOMAs, LEGISLATVE INFORMATION ON THE IN-

TERNET, at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/search.html (last accessed Apr. 12, 2005) (to get
bill status information: (1) choose "Summary and Status Information About Bills and Resolutions"; (2) click "101st Congress"; (3) type "H.R. 5598"; (4) click "Search"; and (5) click
"Text of Legislation"). The bill differed from the original bill in that the prohibition on
sale by farmers of farm animal germ cells, sperm, eggs, and embryos was eliminated. Id.
181. H.R. REP. No. 101-960 (1990).
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support for the basic holding in Ex parte Allen. It also indicated, however, that the Committee viewed the PTO's actions as inappropriately
co-opting the legislative role: "[The bill] -by statutorily clarifying that
transgenic animals are patentable and that transgenic human beings
are not-presumes that the Patent and Trademark Office did usurp
congressional prerogatives, but agrees with the substance of the PTO
18 2
decision as to patentability of transgenic animals."
Although the Commissioner had already announced his position
that human beings could not be patented under the U.S. Constitution, the report stated that a statutory clarification on the subject was
necessary because "the Commissioner is totally without authority to
resolve constitutional issues. 1 83 The report also stated that the Commissioner's statement "does not even detail the precise grounds for
the position," and thus it "must be read as raising the issue, and not
resolving it." 184 The report echoed Senator Hatfield's and Representative Cardin's explicit criticisms of the PTO and more subtle criticisms
of the Supreme Court, stating that the Patent Office "unilaterally and
bureaucratically" decided to allow patenting of animals by "bootstrapping from the rather highly contested decision in the Chakrabarty
case."' 8 5 If the human patents issue would be subject to the same type
of "administrative caprice" by the PTO as was the animal patents issue,
the report declared, congressional action was clearly necessary. 186 The
report also pointedly, noted its agreement with the Chakrabartydissent,
quoting its statement that "'the courts should leave to Congress the
decisions whether and how far to extend the patent privilege into areas where the common understanding has been that patents are not
available.'1"187 The new version of Representative Kastenmeier's bill
did not advance beyond the publishing of the report and, like its pred188
ecessor, failed in committee.

182.
183.

Id. at 17.
Id. at 29.

184.
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Id.
Id. at 18 n.71.
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Id. at 17.
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The Last Gasp for Animal Patenting Legislation

In the early 1990s, three more bills proposing a moratorium on
animal patenting were introduced in Congress. Senator Hatfield in
1991 and Representative Cardin in 1992 introduced identical five-year
moratorium bills in the Senate and the House.189 In 1993, Senator
Hatfield introduced a final two-year moratorium bill in the Senate
which, in addition to an animal patenting moratorium, included a
moratorium on patenting of "human tissues, fluids, cells, [and] genes
or gene sequences." 190 All of the bills failed in committee, 191 and no
new bills on animal patenting have been proposed since 1993. The
lack of new bills was perhaps in part due to the fact that the Patent
Office lifted its voluntary moratorium on the issuing of animal patents
in 1992. Indeed, in 1991, there weremore than 140 patents on animals pending in the Patent Office; 192 as these patents began to be
granted, it is likely that the fight became much harder to win.
In their comments introducing their legislation in the early
1990s, Senator Hatfield and Representative Cardin repeated well-worn
themes, arguing that "Congress must act now if it is ever going to have
the opportunity to examine the effects genetically engineered animals
will have upon our environment and our economy."1 93 In introducing
his 1993 bill, Senator Hatfield again criticized Congress's inaction and
suggested that the PTO's cessation of its unofficial moratorium on
animal patents a year earlier was the direct result of this passivity: "In
my view, [the PTO ended the moratorium] because they can realistically wait no longer for ethical guidance from Congress." 94 Both Representative Cardin and Senator Hatfield also drew attention to
lobbying activity surrounding the bills. After introducing his 1992 bill,
Representative Cardin included in the record a list of fifteen animal
rights and farming groups that supported his legislation. 19 5 Senator
Hatfield criticized the intense lobbying efforts of groups opposed to
his 1993 legislation, claiming that the Association of Biotechnology
Companies and the Industrial Biotechnology Association had used
189. H.R. 4989, 102d Cong. (1992); S. 1291, 102d Cong. (1991).
190. S. 387, 103d Cong. (1993).
191. See THOMAS, LEGISLATIVE INFORMATION ON THE INTERNET, at http://
thomas.loc.gov/home/search.html (last accessed Apr. 12, 2005) (to get bill status information: (1) choose "Summary and Status Information About Bills and Resolutions"; (2) select
the appropriate Congress; (3) type the number of the bill; and (4) click "Search").
192.
193.
194.
195.

138
137
139
138

CONG.
CONG.
CONG.
CONG.

REC.
REc.
REc.
REc.

9591 (1992).
14,870 (1991).
3042 (1993).
9591 (1992).
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"highly questionable tactics" in lobbying against his bill. 196 None of
these appeals seemed to work-neither congressman's legislation
progressed beyond committee.
C.

The Current Human Patentability Debate

In the late 1990s, Congress appeared to lose interest in the implications of patenting living organisms, but the issue of human patentability recently reappeared as part of the larger human cloning
controversy. In June 2002, Senator Sam Brownback, a Republican
from Kansas, proposed legislation prohibiting the patenting of
"human organisms. '197 This bill was distinct from another bill proposed by Senator Brownback specifically to ban human cloning, 198 but
debate on the patent bill was nonetheless dominated by discussions
about the problems with cloning human embryos. In the Senate floor
debate, Senator Brownback declared that Congress must be wary of
those "who are contending that the young human at various stagesan embryo-is not a person, therefore is patentable; that a person can
be patented because it is a piece of property." 199 Senator Brownback
argued that he was proposing the bill "to make it clear to the Patent
Office, [to] the people of America, the people around the world, that
you can't patent a person at any stage or age of its development and
growth." 20 0 He asserted that the debate was about the "future of
20 1
humanity."
Senator Orin Hatch, a Republican from Utah, accused Senator
Brownback of planting a "red herring" by shifting the debate about
the permissibility of human cloning to a bill on patenting, 20 2 a charge
that did not seem far-fetched in view of Senator Brownback's focus on
the ethics of human cloning itself rather than on patents during his
floor speeches. "I am greatly concerned," Senator Hatch stated, "that
in filing this particular amendment, our opponents in this debate are
resorting to tactics that will not result in the careful consideration that
196. 139 CONG. REc. 3043 (1993).
197. S.Amend. 3843, 107th Cong. (2002), amending Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of
2002, S.2600, 107th Cong. (2002), in THOMAS, LEGISLATIVE INFORMATION ON THE INTERNET,
at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/search.html (last accessed Apr. 12, 2005) (to get bill status information: (1) choose "Summary and Status Information About Bills and Resolutions"; (2) click "107th Congress"; (3) type "S.Arnend. 3843"; and (4) click "Search").
198. See Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2001, S. 1899, 107th Cong. (2002).
199. 148 CONG. Rc. S5514 (daily ed. June 13, 2002) (statement of Sen. Brownback).
200. Id. at S5515.
201. Id. at S5520.
202. See id. at S5521.
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this important issue merits." 20 3 Senator Hatch also suggested that the
amendment was unnecessary, since the PTO already had a policy
prohibiting patenting of humans. 20 4 Senator Hatch added that the
patent issue should most properly be examined by the Judiciary Committee and that "[w] e need to know what, if any, tensions, exist between the Brownback Amendment and the Supreme Court's holding
in the famous Chakrabarty decision." 20 5 Senator Brownback conceded
that the Patent Office prohibited human patenting, but argued that
the PTO policy was being challenged in court. 20 6 He declared, "What
I am providing by this amendment is clarity by the legislative
body . ... "207 After significant debate on the issue, Senator Brown20 8
back's amendment never reached a vote in the Senate.
In July of 2003, Representative David Weldon, a Republican from
Florida, proposed an amendment to a House appropriations bill
prohibiting funding for the issuing of patents on claims "directed to
or encompassing a human organism." 20 9 In comments about the
amendment, Representative Weldon insisted that it was simply a restatement of the Patent Office's position against patenting of human
beings, rather than, as some lobbying organizations claimed, an attempt to broaden the scope of the policy to prohibit patents on stem
cell lines or procedures for creating human embryos. 210 The House of
Representatives approved Representative Weldon's amendment in the

203. Id.
204. Id. Interestingly, the Patent Office had announced that it no longer based this
policy on Thirteenth Amendment grounds, but rather on the fact that it had not received
guidance from Congress or the courts on the issue. See Andrew Pollack, Debate on Human
Cloning Turns to Patents, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2002, at A14.
205. 148 CONG. REc. S5521 (daily ed. June 13, 2002).
206.

Id. at S5514.

207.

Id. at S5519.
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tion: (1) choose "Summary and Status Information About Bills and Resolutions"; (2) click
"107th Congress"; (3) type "S.Amend. 3843"; and (4) click "Search").
209. Departments of Commerce,Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act of 2004, H.Amend. 286, 108th Cong. (2003), amending H.R. 2799, in
THOMAS, LEGISLATIVE INFORMATION ON THE INTERNET, at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/
search.html (last accessed Apr. 12, 2005) (to get bill status information: (1) choose "Summary and Status Information About Bills and Resolutions"; (2) click "108th Congress"; (3)
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210.

149 CONG. REC. E2234 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 2003) (statement of Sen. Weldon).
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month that it was proposed,21 1 but the bill never proceeded
212
further.
Overall, congressional discussion of Chakrabarty in the nearly
quarter of a century since the holding has had a consistently negative
tone, with a focus on the perceived aggressiveness of the Court. Congress never overturned the decision, however, nor did it significantly
modify it. Congress evinced a curious lack of interest immediately after the decision, which was followed by attempts by a small number of
congressmen at modifying the holding in the wake of.,the Board of
Patent Appeals's expansive interpretation of it. These congressmen
generally viewed Chakrabarty as a dangerous usurpation of the congressional role and forcefully asserted Congress's duty to legislate in
the area, particularly where necessary to prevent other branches from
filling the void. Ultimately, these efforts to pass legislation on the issue
failed. As described below, this failure could have been due to a variety of factors, and it does not necessarily indicate that Congress as a
whole was indifferent to the issue or approved of the decision. The
next section considers the significance of the congressional response
to Chakrabartyin light of contemporary academic scholarship.
I.

Dynamic Statutory Interpretation and the Interaction
Between Congress and the Court

The Supreme Court acted aggressively in Chakrabarty, interpreting section 101 broadly with little support from either the statutory
language or legislative history. The Court justified its foray into an
area with potentially complex policy implications by suggesting that if
Congress disapproved of the Court's decision or wanted to alter it in
some way, it could respond appropriately. 2 13 Congress did not respond until seven years later, when Chakrabartywas interpreted by the
Patent Office to apply to animals. Even then, each legislative bill proposed in Congress to modify or overturn the holding failed to pass.
This history sheds some light on the relationship between the Supreme Court and Congress, but its import is not entirely clear. Did
Congress respond to Chakrabartyas the Court expected or hoped it to?
Was Congress's inability to pass a bill modifying or overruling the
211. Id.
212. See THOMAS, LEGISLATIVE INFORMATION ON THE INTERNET, at http://
thomas.loc.gov/home/search.html (last accessed Apr. 12, 2005) (to get bill status information: (1) choose "Summary and Status Information About Bills and Resolutions"; (2) click
"108th Congress"; (3) type "H.Amend. 286"; and (4) click "Search").
213. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 318 (1980).
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Chakrabarty decision an indication that the Court's interpretation of
section 101 was "correct" in some sense? Recent academic literature
concerning statutory interpretation and the interactions between the
Supreme Court and Congress helps answer these questions.
A.

Dynamic Statutory Interpretation with an Eye Toward Congress

The Supreme Court's approach to statutory interpretation in
Chakrabartyis consistent with a method proposed by Professor William
2 1 4 and exEskridge in his 1987 article, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation,
panded in his 1991 article, OverridingSupreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions [hereinafter Overriding].215
In Dynamic Statutory Interpretation,Eskridge criticizes the "originalist" model of statutory interpretation and urges courts to update interpretations of statutes in conformity with social changes. According to
Eskridge, the originalist approach, which focuses on the original intent of the drafters of the statute, fails because the drafting legislature
cannot consider every issue that may come up in relation to a statute.2 1 6 Thus, "[a]s society changes, adapts to the statute, and generates new variations of the problem which gave rise to the statute, the
unanticipated gaps and ambiguities proliferate."2 1 7 Eskridge claims
that these 'gaps lead originalist judges to produce out-of-date and
counter-productive statutory interpretations that do not do justice to
the legislature's interests in enacting the statute.2 18 Only through dynamic statutory interpretation can the judiciary properly advance the
legislature's vision and "contribute to the legitimacy of our
government."

219

Eskridge envisions a continuum of cases. On one end of the continuum are cases that involve a recently drafted statute, a detailed statutory text, and a historical context indicating that the legislature
deliberated on the relevant issue and decided it.220 For these cases,
Eskridge says, the language of the text should control the result because a textual reading is likely to accurately reflect both current social understandings and original legislative interests. 22 1 On the other
end of the continuum are cases involving an old statute with general
214.
215.
216.

See Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, supra note 3.
See Eskridge, Overriding, supra note 4.
See Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, supra note 3, at 1480.
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218.

Id.
Id.

219.
220.

Id. at 1532.
Id. at 1496.

221.

Id.

UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

or ambiguous language, a societal or legal context greatly transformed
since the statute's drafting, and little indication that the original drafters considered the relevant interpretive question, 22 2 In those cases,
Eskridge claims, the judge should update the statute in accordance
with the changed societal context, giving little heed to the original
intentions of the drafters.22 3 Eskridge argues that the further a case
falls along this continuum, the freer a judge should feel to interpret
the statute aggressively and use the "evolutive" context of the case to
224
adapt the statute to a contemporary setting.
Chakrabarty presents a case on the far end of Eskridge's continuum. The statute in question, 35 U.S.C. § 101, was passed in 1952,
almost thirty years before Chakrabarty, and its language was taken almost verbatim from a statute passed in 1793.225 The wording of section 101 is very general, 22 6 and the language is ambiguous as to the
permissibility of patenting living organisms. There is no indication
that either the 1952 or 1793 Congress considered the issue of patenting life forms. Most importantly, the social context had changed significantly in the ten years prior to the Chakrabarty decision: the
development of recombinant DNA technology and the increasingly
clear potential of genetic engineering had raised the stakes enormously on the issue of patenting living organisms. Congress in 1952
could not have anticipated the issue that was, in essence, decided by
the Chakrabarty Court: whether patent incentives should be used to
encourage the development of the genetic engineering field. Thus,
under Eskridge's view, the ChakrabartyCourt should have felt no compulsion to stay true to the drafting Congress's original legislative
intent.
In Overriding, Eskridge describes an exhaustive study he performed of congressional responses to statutory interpretation by the
Supreme Court 227 and expands on his theory of statutory interpretation based on his findings. Eskridge describes a "sequential game"
222.

Id.

223.
224.

Id.
Id.

225. Act of February 21, 1793, § 1, 2 Cong. Ch. 11, 1 Stat. 319. As the Court itself
noted, the 1952 version differed from the original from 1793 only in the replacement of
the term "art" with "process," a change which should not have affected the deliberations in
Chakrabary. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309.
226. For example, section 101 permits patenting of "any new and useful... composition of matter." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
227.

See infra Part III.D.
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model of interaction between the institutions that create, interpret,
and enforce statutes:
The model posits that a dynamic game exists between the Court,
the relevant congressional committees, Congress, and the President. In this game, ultimate statutory policy is set through a sequential process by which each player-including the Court-tries
to impose its policy preferences. The game is a dynamic one because each player is responsive to the preferences of other players
and because the preferences of the players228change as information
is generated and distributed in the game.
As part of this game, Eskridge suggests that the Supreme Court
prefers not to be overridden by Congress and thus intentionally interprets statutes as the current Congress would interpret them where it
229
knows that Congress would otherwise override its judgments.
Under this theory, the Court's decisions should closely mirror the current legislature's preferences, except in the marginal case in which
Congress cannot or is unwilling to overturn a Court holding.2 30 Eskridge posits that this behavior is at least a partial explanation for the
relative dearth of congressional overrides of Supreme Court decisions. 23 1 Because the Court is careful to interpret statutes so as not to
be overridden by Congress, Congress tends to override Court interpretations only where congressional preferences have changed over
time, where the Court misinterpreted congressional preferences, or
where the Court actually invited a congressional override for institu23 2
tional reasons.
In Eskridge's view, this empirically observable behavior by the
Court is often normatively valuable. He suggests that such a strategy
eliminates the need for Congress to constantly revisit and update statutes, thus improving legislative efficiency and advancing the legislature's goals. 23 3 Eskridge also claims, however, that an interpretive

approach based strongly on current legislative intent may be too
majoritarian at times, ignoring the preferences of underprivileged
groups that lack political representation. 23 4 Eskridge argues that the
Court should sometimes adopt a deliberately countermajoritarian,
normative approach, acting as the "conscience of the nation's plural228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Eskridge, Overriding,supra note 4, at 334.
Id. at 378.
Id. at 377-79.
Id.
Id. at 387-89.
Id. at 405.
Id. at 411.
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ism by bringing attention to interests that go unrepresented in Wash235
ington and values that are overlooked."
B.

Eskridge and the Chakrabarty Holding

The Supreme Court's opinion in Chakrabarty conforms with the
approach to statutory interpretation described by Eskridge in Dynamic
Statutory Interpretation.Although it is less clear whether the Court was
attempting to avoid an override from Congress as described by Eskridge in Overriding,the Court's opinion and Congress's response to
the decision are consistent with this model.
In dismissing the relevance of the cautionary language in Hook,
the Court in Chakrabarty declared that it was the judiciary's role to
interpret statutes in conformity with changing technology, particularly
in the area of patent law:
Flook did not announce a new principle that inventions in areas not
contemplated by Congress when the patent laws were enacted are
unpatentable per se. To read that concept into Rook would frustrate

the purposes of the patent law. This Court frequently has observed
that a statute is not to be confined to the "particular application[s] ... contemplated by the legislators." ...
236
true in the field of patent law.

This is especially

This language fits comfortably within Eskridge's dynamic statutory interpretation model. The ChakrabartyCourt suggested that, since
advancing technologies continuously alter the legal scope and significance of patent law, courts must be free to modify their interpretations of relevant statutes to remain consistent with the contemporary
context. 23 7 Just as Eskridge suggests, the Court considered "not only
what the legislation mean [t] abstractly . . .but also what it ought to
mean in terms of the needs and goals of our present day society."2 38
Of course, the Court in Chakrabarty did not explicitly adopt an
aggressive interpretive posture. Its statements that "Congress plainly
contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide scope" 239 and
that "Congress employed broad general language in drafting § 101
precisely because such inventions are often unforeseeable" 240 suggest
that Congress deliberately drafted section 101 with the hope that the
235. Id. at 413 (quotes omitted).
236. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315-16 (1980) (citations omitted).
237. See id.
238. Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation,supra note 3, at 1480 (quoting Arthur
Phelps, Factors Influencing Judges in InterpretingStatutes, 3 VAND. L. REv. 456, 469 (1950)).

239.
240.
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Court would adapt the statute to unforeseen technologies, and that
the Court's authorization of Chakrabarty's patent was therefore entirely consistent with the text.
While this view has some merit, it cannot transform the
Chakrabarty holding into a conservative exercise in basic statutory interpretation. The Court's interpretation of section 101 as evincing a
congressional intention to allow expansion of the patent laws far beyond what was foreseen at the time was itself an assertive choice, conducive to the dynamic interpretive approach and not in any sense
required by the text of the statute.2 41 Just two years earlier in Flook, the
Court had rejected the view that section 101 permitted the Court to
expand the scope of patent law whenever new technologies demanded it.2 2 The Court in Flook stated that expansion of the patent
privilege must be "based on more than mere inference from ambiguous statutory language" and that a "clear and certain signal from Congress" would be required before approving a broader scope to patent
protection than previously described by the courts. 243 Prior to the
Chakrabarty decision, the statutory language was clearly ambiguous as
to the permissibility of patenting life, no "clear and certain signal" had
emerged from Congress, and, although legal precedent on the issue
was not entirely clear-cut, courts had never permitted patents on living
organisms in the past. Under the Court's own formula in F/ook, then,
the appropriate response would have been to reject Chakrabarty's application and allow Congress to address the issue. Instead, the Court
reversed its position in Rook and permitted an unprecedented, highly
controversial expansion of the patent privilege. This decision can be
explained only as a quite pragmatic adoption of a dynamic interpretive approach.
Whether the Supreme Court considered the possibility of a congressional override in coming to its decision in Chakrabarty, as Eskridge's argument in Overriding would suggest, is impossible to saysuch behavior can be researched only through large scale studies, as
Eskridge has done. Interestingly, despite all of the activity in Congress
in opposition to the Chakrabartyholding over more than a decade, the
decision has never been overridden by the legislature. This result is at
least consistent with Eskridge's thesis.

241.
242.
243.

See discussion supra Part I.B.
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 596 (1978).
Id. (quoting Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972)).

UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW

C.

[Vol. 39

Criticisms of Eskridge's Approach

Statutory interpretation has enjoyed significant academic attention in recent years, and a number of theorists have proposed important alternatives to Eskridge's approach. The Chakrabartycase provides
an intriguing lens through which to consider some of these
alternatives.
1. Manning and Textualism
ProfessorJohn Manning, a leading adherent of the textualist doctrine, suggests that to properly fulfill their roles as faithful agents of
the legislature,judges should enforce only the plain meaning of a statute as written, even if this occasionally requires allowing absurd resuits.

24 4

Manning argues against the use of legislative history or any

other extra-statutory tool that might illuminate what Congress "really
intended" as to a particular issue, suggesting that "the legislative process is simply too complex and too opaque to permit judges to get
inside Congress's 'mind.'-

24 5

Any concept of genuine collective legis-

lative intent distinct from that expressed in the statutory text is meaningless, Manning claims. 246 He also argues that the use of legislative
history allows Congress to unconstitutionally delegate its legislative
power to the courts; textualism prevents such delegation, he suggests,
by requiring Congress to fully elucidate the meaning of a statute in
24 7
the text of the statute itself.

One could argue that Chakrabartywas actually decided under the
textualist rubric. Since section 101 states that the inventor or discoverer of "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter... may obtain a patent therefore," and provides no
exception for living organisms,

2 48

the Chakrabarty bacterium would

seem to fit easily within the plain text of the statute. But if Chakrabarty
was a passive textualist decision, why was the holding considered by
the media to be an "awesome challenge" to Congress, and why did
several members of Congress describe the decision as an unwarranted
judicial usurpation of legislative prerogatives? 249
The problem is that the legal precedent and conventional wisdom that had developed since the enactment of section 101 strongly
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

SeeJohn Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARv. L. REv. 2388, 2392 (2003).
Id. at 2390.
Id. at 2408.
See Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, supra note 5, 675-76 (1997).
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
See supra Parts I.C, II.B.
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suggested that living organisms were unpatentable. Where a solid legal position on an issue has built up over many decades and is supported by conventional wisdom within society, as in Chakrabarty, the
Court's holding in contravention of that position, even if consistent
with the plain meaning of a statute, cannot reasonably be considered
faithful to the spirit of textualist methodology. As Eskridge has noted,
textualism "lacks a satisfactory theory of precedent";2 50 in this sense,
the doctrine seems descriptively incomplete.
On a broader level, textualism is unhelpful in resolving the central dilemma raised by cases such as Chakrabarty. The question of
whether to consider legislative history to determine the enacting legislature's collective "intent," the main focus for Manning, is largely irrelevant in Chakrabarty because there is no enacting legislative "intent"
that could possibly be elucidated in that case. The enacting Congresses in 1793 and 1952 could not have foreseen or understood the
issues raised in Chakrabarty,and trying to uncover their views on patenting of living organisms would be a pointless exercise. The real
question in the Chakrabartycontext is how to proceed when social circumstances have changed so drastically since the enactment of a law
that both the actual text of the statute and extra-textual indicators as
to Congress's intentions are close to useless in deciding a contemporary controversy. As to this problem, Manning's theory is not helpful.
2.

Elhauge and Preference-Estimating

Professor Einer Elhauge points out the failings of the textualist
251
approach in his article, Preference-EstimatingStatutory Default Rules.
Elhauge argues that statutory interpretation involves two distinct concerns: (1) "How should courts divine the meaning of statutes?" and
(2) "How should courts decide what to do when they cannot divine a
statute's meaning?" 25 2 Elhauge argues that the first problem is the focus of textualism and several other theories of statutory interpretation, while the second problem has been largely neglected within
academia. 25 3 It is this second problem that makes the Chakrabartycase
difficult.
While Elhauge, like Eskridge, rejects the basic premises of textualism, he disagrees in important ways with Eskridge's model and suggests a third alternative for statutory interpretation. Elhauge contends
250.
251.
252.
253.

William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621, 682 (1990).
See Elhauge, supra note 6.
Id. at 2029.
Id.
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that where statutory ambiguity and changed circumstances leave a
statute's meaning as to a particular issue unclear, judges should not
resort to policy judgments but should instead act as "honest agents for
the political branches." 25

4

While this might seem difficult in the ab-

sence of any evidence of the enacting legislature's actual intentions,
Elhauge argues that it can be achieved through the use of "preference-estimating default rules" in statutory interpretation-rules that
would generally minimize political dissatisfaction with the interpretive
result.2 55 Elhauge's suggestion for a central default rule places his ap-

proach squarely between the theories of Eskridge and Manning:
I conclude that where there is ambiguity in statutory meaning, the
enacting government's preferences would overall be maximized by
a general default rule that dynamically tracks the enactable preferences of the current government-where those preferences can be de-

termined with relative reliability-rather than
256 statically sticking
with the enacting government's preferences.
Elhauge suggests that although his model focuses on the preferences of the current legislature, it is in fact faithful to the preferences
of the enacting legislature. 25 7 The enacting legislature, he argues,
would prefer to have power over all existing statutes during its time in
office, including those enacted by previous legislatures, rather than to
have power only over those statutes it actually enacted, even if such
258
power were to extend into the distant future.
Elhauge is careful to distinguish his theory from purer dynamic
statutory interpretation theories such as Eskridge's, which encourage
judges to update old statutes along with changing values and preferences in society at large. 259 In Elhauge's view, a judge may update a
statute through statutory interpretation only where the change could
actually be enacted into law by the current legislature, taking into account all of the political and procedural barriers involved in such an
enterprise. 260 Imposing such a limitation on dynamic statutory interpretation by a court, Elhauge argues, allows judges to act as agents
"for the political forces that can command enough political agreement to enact statutes," while not allowing judges to "take sides where
political gridlock exists." 26 ' Such a system is helpful to the legislature,
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

2029-30.
2034, 2036.
2084 (second emphasis added).
2084-85.

at 2105-06.
at 2106.
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Elhauge suggests, in those situations where an enactable preference
might not become law due to the simple costs of legislating or might
take more time to be enacted than the legislature would prefer:
[T] he whole point of using preference-estimating default rules is
to minimize political dissatisfaction for issues too minor to provoke
legislative action, or in the interim before the legislature acts, and
to free the political process from the needless burden of making
probably make if time and political energy
enactments it would
26 2
were not scarce.

For a preference to be considered currently enactable so as to
justify dynamic statutory interpretation by a court, it must be "memorialized in some relatively well-defined official political action," Elhauge
states. 263 He suggests that where the current legislature amends or enacts a statute without altering an interpretation of a statute that has
been brought to its attention, there is a good chance that the interpretation is enactable. 264 He also argues that subsequent legislative history may in some cases provide a good indication that a preference is
2 65
currently enactable.
Under Elhauge's paradigm, the Court's holding in Chakrabarty
was incorrect. Since section 101 was ambiguous as to the permissibility
of the patenting of living organisms and the social context had
changed greatly since enactment of the statute, Elhauge would focus
on whether a law allowing patenting of living organisms would be currently enactable by the legislature. The answer in this case is almost
certain: Congress in 1980 could not have enacted such a law. Genetic
engineering was quite controversial at the time, and there was no sign
of a developing political consensus on the issue, as Elhauge would
require. In fact, the Chakrabartyholding ushered in a new era rather
than following a trend, as is aptly demonstrated by the astonished reaction of both the press and the legislature to the ChakrabartyCourt's
decision. This fact would probably have been clear to the Court at the
time. Certainly, Elhauge's requirement that the preference for allowing organism patenting be "memorialized in some relatively well266
defined official political action" was not satisfied.
It is important to distinguish Elhauge's view from Eskridge'swhile Elhauge argues against dynamic statutory interpretation unless a
political preference is actually enactable by the current legislature, Es262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

2120.
2107.
2112-13.
2115-17.
2107.
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kridge asserts that dynamic statutory interpretation is generally permissible as to political preferences that will not be overridden by the
legislature. 267 This distinction is critical, since dynamic statutory interpretation by the Court is likely to have the most significant effect precisely in those holdings permitted by Eskridge but forbidden by
Elhauge-where the issue is not quite controversial enough for the
legislature to reverse the court, but not politically harmless enough
for the legislature itself to enact the preference into law, at least at the
present time. Chakrabartyfalls within this category.
In cases with implications for scientific and technological progress, Eskridge's more permissive approach is the superior one. Such
cases are generally characterized by important time constraints; therefore, a court's decision to update a statute ten years before the legislature would have achieved the change (as was arguably the situation in
Chakrabarty) may critically impact the pace of scientific innovation. In
this context, Elhauge's requirement that a court wait until the change
could be enacted by the legislature is inadequate, leaving the court
almost as passive as a textualist approach would. A few months might
be saved under this model, but likely little more. Elhauge's model
does not take full advantage of the particular trait that makes courts
such valuable partners to the legislature: the ability to make change
quickly.
Elhauge's objections to endorsing dynamic statutory interpretation wherever congressional override is unlikely are significant. He argues that although some judicial judgment is always required in the
realm of statutory interpretation, allowing judges to judicially impose
unenactable preferences undermines the country's democratic institutions. 2 68 Elhauge suggests that this type of statutory interpretation

might in fact be constitutionally problematic, since it would permit
the development of law outside the bounds of bicameralism and
presentment.

269

Elhauge himself admits, however, that deciding which political
preferences are actually enactable is itself a difficult and imprecise enterprise, allowing room for judges to draw the fine lines and consider
the policy issues that Elhauge would like them to ignore. 2 70 Assuming,
267. As mentioned above, Eskridge also argues that the Court should have even more
flexibility in cases where minority interests are at stake. That position is not being advocated here.
268. See Elhauge, supra note 6, at 2106-07.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 2065.
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then, that judicial discretion is unavoidable where a dynamic approach is used, the complete legislative supremacy championed by
Elhauge seems an impracticable goal, not significantly more likely to
occur under his approach than under Eskridge's. Elhauge's approach
would undeniably lead to some higher degree of fealty to legislative
preferences than Eskridge's, but the difference would be marginal
and too insignificant to sacrifice the valuable efficiency goals promoted by Eskridge's approach, at least where time-sensitive scientific
innovation is involved. Eskridge's strategy would sufficiently guarantee
legislative supremacy and would set a more optimal balance between
society's interests in preventing judicial policy-making and its interests
in keeping the law in step with technological progress.
D.

The Ability of Congress to Respond to Supreme Court
Statutory Holdings

Of course, the view delineated above depends on the proposition
that Congress is generally vigilant in reviewing judicial interpretations
of its statutes, at least by the Supreme Court. If Congress does not
generally pay attention to Supreme Court interpretations and override those with which it disagrees, Eskridge's theory would allow the
Court to impose its own legal preferences on society with no restriction. In that case, Elhauge's method presents a better way to protect
democratic institutions. Professor Eskridge has contributed greatly to
elucidating this important issue.
In Ovenriding, Eskridge argues that despite conventional wisdom
suggesting that Congress is ignorant of Supreme Court interpretations
of federal statutes, Congress and congressional committees are actually "aware of the Court's statutory decisions, devote significant efforts
towards analyzing their policy implications, and override those deci27 1
sions with a frequency heretofore unreported."
To test his theory, Eskridge performed a thorough empirical
study of Supreme Court federal statutory decisions overridden, or at
least considered and discussed, by Congress between 1967 and
1991.272 Eskridge found that Congress considers and deliberates over
a large proportion of Supreme Court statutory decisions and overrides
a small though not insignificant number of these. Between 1975 and
1990, for example, each Congress overrode an average of approximately twelve Supreme Court statutory decisions, and almost half of
271.
272.

Eskridge, Overriding, supra note 4, at 334.
Id. at 337-38.
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the Court's statutory decisions per year since 1975 had been or were
soon to be the focus of congressional hearings in 1991, when Eskridge
published the article. 273 Based on this data, Eskridge concludes that
"the Supreme Court's statutory decisions are accessible to Congress"
and that "key staff members become aware of any significant Supreme
Court decision affecting issues within their committee's jurisdiction."2 74 Eskridge further notes that when Congress decides to over-

ride a Court decision, it usually does so quickly. In Eskridge's study, of
the Supreme Court cases that were overridden, almost one-half were
two-thirds within five
overridden within two years of the decision,
2 75
years.
ten
within
years, and three-quarters
Eskridge also considered the nature of Supreme Court statutory
decisions that were most and least likely to be overridden by Congress.
He found that cases dealing with criminal law, antitrust, civil rights,
and bankruptcy were overridden at the highest rates. 276 Patent law
cases, grouped together with copyright and trademark cases, were
overridden at an intermediate rate as compared to other types of
cases. 2 77 Perhaps unsurprisingly, Eskridge found that the more fragmented or ideologically divided the Court had been in its holding, the
more likely Congress was to overturn the decision: most of the holdings overridden by Congress were decided by a four to four, five to
four, or six to three Court, and three-fifths were ideologically divided
in some way, usually with Justices Brennan and Marshall on one side
278
and Justice Rehnquist on the other.
Eskridge also considered who the "losing" groups were in the
court cases that were most likely to be overridden by Congress. His
findings indicate that federal, state, and local governments are significantly more likely to convince Congress to override an adverse Supreme Court decision than any other group. 279 In contrast, religious
groups, the poor, veterans, non-citizens, racial minorities, criminal de273. Id. at 335-36. The Chakrabartydecision is noted in the article as a case for which
House committee hearings were held, but no bill was passed. Id. at 445 app. II.
274. Id. at 343.
275. Id. at 345.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 344.
278. Id. at 346-47. It is interesting to note that although Chakrabartywas a five to four
decision, it did not divide neatly along traditional ideological lines-conservative Justices
Burger and Rehnquist were in the majority with Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Stevens,
and liberal Justices Marshall and Brennan were joined by more centrist Justices White and
Powell. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 304 (1980).
279. See Eskridge, Overriding,supra note 4, at 348.
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fendants, the disabled, and women are among the groups least likely
280
to achieve a congressional override.
Congress is generally unable or unwilling to pass legislation
where powerful interest groups are aligned on both sides of an issue.
In the twenty-four years between 1967 and 1991, Eskridge says, there
were "only a handful of overrides in which Congress acted against the
strong opposition of an important. interest group, and the overrides in
28 1
those cases required a herculean effort."
Eskridge notes an interesting corollary to this phenomenon: in
the arena of Supreme Court statutory interpretation, the most controversial instances of judicial policymaking are generally least likely to
be overridden by Congress because in such cases there are generally
"strong interest group alignments on both sides of the issues, leaving
the Court's decisions firmly intact."28 2 For this reason, he observes,
"[t]he Court's most dramatic policymaking decisions have remained
283
untouched by Congress."
Eskridge notes that such a phenomenon would be troubling if it
were responsible for preventing a large number of congressional overrides, as this would confirm the fear that the judiciary is writing its
policy preferences permanently into law. 284 He suggests, however, that

the real explanation for the relative scarcity of congressional overrides
is that the Court tends to interpret statutes as it believes the current
Congress would interpret them, so as to intentionally avoid an
285
override.
Thus, Eskridge's data generally supports the view that Congress is
vigilant in reviewing Supreme Court interpretations of federal statutes. His findings as to the power of interest groups are significant,
however. The results suggest that in updating old statutes while avoiding congressional overrides, the Court should be cognizant of those
cases in which interest group gridlock leaves Congress unable rather
280. Id.
281. Id. at 367.
282. Id. at 377.
283. Id. at 366. Eskridge cites the following as examples: "affirmative action in employment, the home video and audio recording of copyrighted works, the application of criminal racketeering laws to garden variety commercial disputes, and contribution in antitrust
cases." Id. He refers specifically to the Supreme Court cases Sony Corp. ofAmerica v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (recording); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473
U.S. 479 (1985) (racketeering laws); and Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451
U.S. 630 (1981) (contribution in antitrust cases). Eskridge, Overriding,supra note 4, at 366,
nn.102-104.
284. Id. at 377-78.
285. Id. at 378.
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than unwilling to override a Court decision. This context provides a
particularly strong argument for Elhauge's approach, since a Court
willing to act in the absence of congressional override in such cases
would likely subvert the intentions of Congress, while a Court willing
to create changes only if they could be enacted by the current legislature would not. The Court should avoid aggressive interpretation in
such cases. 286 With this caveat, however, Eskridge's findings suggest
that his model would not be characterized by judicial policymaking
run amok, but would instead usefully balance majoritarian interests
and efficient development of the law.
On the other hand, legislative inaction, the only indicator of congressional preferences available under Eskridge's approach, is generally considered an unreliable signal, as Eskridge himself has noted. In
his 1988 article, Interpreting Legislative Inaction, Eskridge discusses
whether courts interpreting statutes should consider Congress's failure to overrule a particular judicial interpretation as indicating that
Congress approves of the interpretation. 28 7 Eskridge states, "I believe
that legislative inaction usually tells us very little about actual legislative intent," and he notes the many complexities of the legislative process that make interpretation of legislative inaction an often fruitless
enterprise. 288 First, Eskridge says, "it is very hard to aggregate preferences in such a large collection of people." 28 9 Second, because of the

limited legislative agenda in Congress, "it is far more likely that something will not happen (inaction) than that it will (action)," due largely
to inertia. 290 Even where a bill has substantial support, Eskridge notes,
severe procedural roadblocks may be erected by opponents of the
291
legislation.
Again, these difficulties in interpreting legislative inaction argue
in favor of Elhauge's model, since under that approach only affirmative action by Congress can provide a sufficient signal to permit dynamic statutory interpretation by the Court. But while Elhauge's view
provides some additional safeguards againstjudicial policymaking, the
286. Of course, this requires a certain level of self-regulation by the Court. This factor
does not, however, distinguish the theory from Elhauge's, which requires the Court to
determine what the current Congress would be able to enact, leaving significant discretion
to the Justices.
287. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MIcH. L.
REv. 67 (1988).
288. Id. at 108.
289. Id. at 98.
290. Id. at 98-99.
291. Id. at 99.
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difference is not great, both because Congress generally does respond
to Court opinions with which it strongly disagrees, as Eskridge demonstrates, and because either theory allows significant room for judicial
discretion. Ultimately, both Elhauge and Eskridge ask the Court to
accept the dangerous task of reading Congress's "mind." Due to
Elhauge's strict safeguards, however, his model is likely to have little
real impact while nonetheless raising the same countermajoritarian
concerns inherent in Eskridge's approach. Eskridge straightforwardly
acknowledges the countermajoritarian problems with his model, but
suggests that the benefits outweigh the costs. At least in the technological arena, Eskridge's approach is the correct one. The Chakrabarty
case provides an excellent example of the Supreme Court's ability to
dynamically advance the law while showing sufficient respect for
majoritarian demands.
E.

The Congressional Response to Chakrabarty

At least two clear stages characterized the congressional reaction
to Chakrabarty-the initial lack of response between 1980 and 1987,
and the later debates in the House and Senate following the Board's
decision in Ex parte Allen in 1987. These stages are considered separately below.
1. 1980 to 1987: No Word from Congress
The lack of interest in the Chakrabarty decision evinced by Congress between 1980 and 1987 is quite significant in light of Eskridge's
findings. In the period between the 96th and 100th Congresses
(1979-1988), Congress scrutinized a total of 262 Supreme Court statutory decisions and overrode sixty-two such decisions. 292 Eskridge did
not calculate a precise ratio of scrutinized to unscrutinized Supreme
Court decisions during this period, but he did find, for example, that
between the 1977 and 1983 Supreme Court terms, the House and
Senate Judiciary Committees scrutinized an average of thirty-nine percent of all the Supreme Court's statutory interpretation cases that
were within their jurisdiction. 293 Congress's complete lack of response
to Chakrabarty thus suggests that it "approved of," or at least did not
disagree with, the holding-that the Court in some sense enacted the
legislature's preferences into law.
292.
293.

See Eskridge, Overriding,supra note 4, at 341-42.
Id.
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The objection that congressional inaction is difficult to interpret
does not appear particularly significant in relation to the 1980-87
congressional reaction to Chakrabarty. The fact that Congress actively
considered Chakrabartyafter the 1987 Allen decision suggests that such
an investigation could have occurred immediately following the holding had there been sufficient interest and that Congress' silence at the
time indicated some level of acquiescence to the decision, rather than
a procedural or interest group-created roadblock. In addition, Eskridge's description of how legislation can fall through procedural
cracks seems to apply more strongly to cases in which the legislature
considers an issue and then fails to follow through, as Congress did
after 1987. In that case, the procedural or political reasons for the
failure could be manifold. Where Congress shows absolutely no interest in an issue, however, these explanations seem implausible, particularly in light of Eskridge's convincing evidence that Congress regularly
deliberated upon large numbers of Supreme Court decisions during
the period of the Chakrabartydecision.
It is notable that while a long congressional silence followed the
Chakrabartydecision, Congress began to deliberate over the holding
almost immediately following the Allen decision, which interpreted
Chakrabartyto permit animal patenting. Perhaps this pattern indicates
that Congress originally did not interpret Chakrabartyto apply to animals and was unconcerned by the holding for that reason. Under this
view, Congress's original passivity in the face of the Chakrabartydecision was due to a misunderstanding of the holding's significance and
thus sheds little light on whether the decision was in any sense consistent with legislative preferences. It may therefore be more interesting
to consider the legislative activity that followed, the Allen decision,
when the expansiveness of the Chakrabarty holding became quite
clear.
2.

1987 to the Present: A String of Failed Proposals

The significance of the multitude of failed congressional bills that
followed Ex parte Allen is difficult to determine, in part because of the
problems with interpreting legislative inaction described above. Many
factors, including inertia and the high volume of material considered
by Congress, may have led to the failure of the bills. Several points are
notable, however.
First, the Court's suggestion in Chakrabarty---thatthe policy issues
involved in the case should be considered by Congress rather than the
Court, through the process of "balancing [ ] competing values and
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interests, which in our democratic system is the business of elected
representatives," 2 94 -was arguably realized in the form of Representative Kastenmeier's 1987 hearings in the House Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Technology. As described above, 295 those
hearings included statements by representatives of nearly every group
with a stake in the issue, and the legal, ethical, scientific, political, and
economic implications of the decision were all considered by the committee. In this sense, the Court appropriately relied on Congress to
consider the policy issues in Chakrabarty. This is not an insignificant
point. As Eskridge points out, congressional committees play a crucial
role in gathering information, deliberating, and making recommendations to the larger legislative body. 2 96 Most critically, Eskridge says,
congressional committees "serve as devices to screen out the vast majority of policy proposals submitted to Congress." 29 7 Thus, where a
congressional committee considers in depth a policy concern explicily referred to it by the courts, a crucial step in the democratic process is functioning properly.
Of course, such a process would not alleviate the countermajoritarian concerns related to aggressive Supreme Court statutory interpretation in certain cases. As Eskridge notes, on certain issues that are
particularly controversial or on which powerful interest groups are
evenly divided, Congress may be unable to act, leaving the Court's
interpretation intact due to political complications rather than actual
legislative approval. 298 Is Chakrabartysuch a case? It is clear that certain interest groups were heavily involved in the issue. Nine organizations filed amicus briefs in Chakrabarty.299 Congressmen debating the
294.

Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 317 (1980).

295.

See supra discussion Part II.B.1.

296.

See Eskridge, Overniding, supra note 4, at 368.

297. Id. at 370.
298. Id. at 366-67.
299. The amicus briefs filed in Chakrabartywere the following: Brief of Amicus Curiae
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, No. 79-136, 1980 WL
339771 (U.S. Jan. 29, 1980) (for Chakrabarty); Brief of Amicus Curiae American Patent
Law Association, Inc., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, No. 79-136, 1980 WL 339772 (U.S. Jan. 29,
1980) (for Chakrabarty); Brief of Amicus Curiae Dr. George Pieczenik, Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, No. 79-136, 1980 WL 339773 (U.S.Jan. 29, 1980) (for the government); Brief
of Amicus Curiae Genentech, Inc., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, No. 79-136, 1980 WL 339766
(U.S. Jan. 28, 1980) (for Chakrabarty); Brief of Amicus Curiae New York Patent Law Association, Inc., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, No. 79-136, 1980 WL 339769 (U.S. Jan. 28, 1980) (for
Chakrabarty); Brief of Amicus Curiae Regents of the University of California, Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, No. 79-136, 1980 WL 339770 (U.S. Jan. 28, 1980) (for Chakrabarty); Brief of
Amicus Curiae Dr. Leroy E. Hood et al., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, No. 79-136, 1980 WL
339764 (U.S. Jan. 26, 1980) (for Chakrabarty, but urging the Court to remand for consideration of the product of nature doctrine); Brief of Amicus Curiae Peoples Business Com-
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issue on the House and Senate floors referred to lobbying activity several times, most significantly from biotechnology companies arguing
against modification of the Chakrabarty holding,3 00 but also from
animal rights groups, farming groups, and others in favor of reform.3 0 1 Ananda Chakrabarty himself remembers that Chakrabarty
"was greeted with joy and a sense of relief by the biotech industry and
academic researchers. [But it] was viewed with disdain and frustration
by many public interest and religious groups ....,,02 The issue has

become even more polarized today, due to the added controversy over
human cloning. There is thus certainly a possibility that congressional
inaction on the issue has been due to an interest group-created
impasse.
The presence of interest groups should not in and of itself imply
that Congress was forced into an impasse regarding the Chakrabarty
holding, however. The evidence indicates that the interest group pressure on Congress as to Chakrabartywas not evenly divided, at least perhaps until the most recent cloning developments. In fact, only two of
the nine amicus curiae in the case argued in favor of the government,30

3

and the discussion of interest group pressure in Congress

points to forceful lobbying by biotech companies in favor of the decision, but not to significant pressure from anti-Chakrabarty groups.
While the losing party in the case was formally the federal government, which, according to Eskridge, generally has significant success
in persuading Congress to override a Supreme Court decision, there
is no evidence that the federal government lobbied against the decision in Congress. The real losing parties in the case were those
presenting normative challenges to the decision, who probably did
not have major lobbying capabilities. Thus, it seems unlikely, based on
Eskridge's data, that Congress's inaction following Chakrabartywas due
to an interest group impasse.

mission, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, No. 79-136, 1979 WL 200005 (U.S. Dec. 13, 1979) (for
the government); Brief of Amicus Curiae American Society for Microbiology, Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, No. 79-136, 1979 WL 200007 (U.S. 1979) (for Chakrabarty).
300. For example, Senator Hatfield accused some biotech companies of "highly questionable tactics." 139 CONG. REc. 3043 (1992) (statement of Sen. Hatfield).
301. See id.; 138 CONG. REc. 9591 (1992).
302. E-mail from Dr. Ananda Chakrabarty to Anna Lumelsky (Jan. 24, 2004) (on file
with author).
303. See amicus briefs listed, supra note 299.
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Conclusion
Ultimately, it is almost impossible to definitively determine
whether the Court's decision in Chakrabarty was consistent with congressional preferences or not. When the legislature does not override
the Court's statutory interpretation, is it because the Court correctly
gauged legislative preferences or because those preferences were
stymied? Under the model described above-under which the Court
interprets statutes dynamically, but is limited by an intention of avoiding congressional override-no such determination is necessary. It is
precisely this lesser need for legislative authorization that distinguishes Eskridge's from Elhauge's approach. While Elhauge demands
written evidence that Congress itself would be willing to enact the
Court's interpretation into law, Eskridge is satisfied with the guarantee that Congress will override an interpretation to which it is sufficiently opposed. Eskridge's Court is a much more aggressive player in
the "sequential game," acting as an active partner to Congress.
Had the Supreme Court decided Chakrabarty differently, would
Congress have amended section 101 to allow the patenting of living
organisms? Congress's inaction in the face of Chakrabartysuggests that
it would have. Mr. Chakrabarty himself believes that Congress would
have allowed patenting of living organisms, but not immediately:
"Congress is not known to take quick action on anything that's controversial ....Thus my hunch is that Congress would have taken at least
10 years to pass legislation on the patentability of life forms and only
30°4
under intense pressure from the biotech lobby.
If Chakrabarty is correct that Congress would have waited ten
years before permitting animal patenting, the Chakrabarty holding
likely had critical importance in keeping up the pace of advancements
in genetic engineering in the United States. As the current debate on
human cloning and patentability in Congress demonstrates, the impact of the Chakrabarty holding continues to be extraordinarily broad
twenty-five years after the decision. Chakrabarty opened the door to
innovations such as the Harvard mouse and other transgenic animals,
which have provided extraordinary insight into human disease. The
decision has likely also encouraged production of the many varieties
of patented transgenic plants that are pest-resistant, nutrient-rich, and
might someday ameliorate malnutrition in many countries.
Of course, it is impossible to know precisely what Congress would
have done in the absence of Chakrabarty-thisis the dilemma with
304.
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which Eskridge's approach leaves us. But in the area of patent law,
where the rapid pace of technological progress suggests both that
Congress cannot amend statutes at a sufficiently fast rate and that legal delays can cause severe consequences to scientific progress, this is
a cost that brings with it many benefits. There is no sign that the pace
of scientific innovation is slowing, and the Court can and should have
the same impact on other areas of technology that it has had on the
progress of genetic engineering.3 0 5 Congress is an inherently slow institution, and as science and technology evolve at an increasingly
rapid rate and patent law continues to play a central role in encouraging further innovation, the Court must be empowered to update patent doctrine through the aggressive interpretation of statutes.

305. It should be noted that some commentators do not believe that Chakrabarty encouraged increased scientific innovation, for reasons unrelated to the assertions in this
Article. In particular, some critics argue that the unprecedented expansion of patent rights
in biotechnology that followed the Chakrabartydecision has led to an unwillingness among
researchers to share data and has impeded widespread genetic testing that could further
progress in medical research. See, e.g., Tom Abate, Do Gene Patents Wrap Research in Red
Tape?, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 25, 2002, at El (discussing the argument that patenting of gene
sequences has been detrimental to scientific progress); Justin Gillis, Gene Research Success
Spurs Profit Debate, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2000, at Al (same).

